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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF
THE STATE OF UTAH

MARK GRAHAM,

:

Petitioner,

:

vs.

:

UTAH AIR QUALITY BOARD,

:

Respondent

Case No. 2000 0042

Priority No. 14

:

BRIEF OF PETITIONER
MARK GRAHAM

__

AN APPEAL FROM A FINAL ORDER OF
THE UTAH AIR QUALITY BOARD
(Case Below No. 9903004)

___

Appellant, Mark Graham by and through counsel of
record, submits the following Brief of Appellant:

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court or Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction over this appeal of a final decision by
the Utah Air Quality Board (hereinafter "Board"),
1

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (1) (1996), which
grants the appellate courts jurisdiction to review all
final agency actions resulting from formal adjudicative
proceedings.

The Utah Court of Appeals has

jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (a) (1996) (Court of Appeals has
appellate jurisdiction over final orders resulting from
formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
I.

Issue
Did the Board erroneously deny Mr. Graham's

Petition to Intervene when it determined that Mr.
Graham's stake in the proceedings was insufficient to
establish that his "legal interests may be
substantially affected by the formal adjudicative
proceeding"1 dealing with a regulated facility that
routinely emits toxic doses of dioxin/furan in excess

1

Utah Code. Ann. § 63-46b-9(2)(a)(1996).

2

of its State permit, even though Mr. Graham lives 2 ^
miles from the facility?

II. Statement of Grounds for Seeking Review
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-9 mandates that
intervention "shall" be granted in cases like that of
Mr. Graham where affected citizens seek the opportunity
to participate in agency adjudication and decisionmaking.

Since the Board nevertheless denied Mr.

Graham's petition for intervention, Mr. Graham seeks
judicial review of the Board's decision under Utah Code
Ann. § 63-46b-16(l) and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (a).

III. Standard of Review
The standard of review of this issue is determined
by Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (1996) . This provision
instructs the appellate court to grant relief when a
petitioner has been substantially prejudiced because an
agency has "erroneously interpreted or applied the
law'S Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(d)(1996), and/or an
agency action is "an abuse of the discretion delegated
to the agency by statute", Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b3

16(4) (h) (i), or is "arbitrary or capricious".

Utah

Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iv)(1996).

STATUTORY PROVISIONS

Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-9 (1996):
(l) Any person not a party may file a signed, written
petition to intervene in a formal adjudicative
proceeding with the agency. The person who wishes to
intervene shall mail a copy of the petition to each
party. The petition shall include:
(a)the agency's file number or other reference
number;
(b)the name of the proceeding;
(c)a statement of facts demonstrating that the
petitioner's legal rights or interests are
substantially affected by the formal
adjudicative proceeding, or that the petitioner
qualifies as an intervenor under any provision
of law; and
(d)a statement of the relief that the petitioner
seeks from the agency.
(2)The presiding officer shall grant a petition for
intervention if he determines that:
(a)the petitioner's legal interests may be
substantially affected by the formal
adjudicative proceeding; and
(b)the interests of justice and the orderly and
prompt conduct of the adjudicative proceedings
will not be materially impaired by allowing the
intervention.

4

STATEMENT OF CASE
I.

Nature of the Case
This case turns on the issues of open government

and the opportunity for citizens to influence agency
decision-making.

By denying Mr. Graham's petition to

intervene in a permit violation proceeding, the Board
effectively ruled out citizen intervention in any
adjudication directly impacting air quality and the
health and welfare of the public and the environment.
In addressing this "confusing"2 and "difficult" issue,
the Board fluctuates between applying the doctrines of
intervention and standing to reach the merits of Mr.
Graham's petition.

Moreover, the Board incorrectly

applied these doctrines, concluding that Mr. Graham's
intervention was not proper despite his assertions
that, among other things, he lives 2 4 miles from the
facility and that he and the ecosystem of the Great
Salt Lake are adversely affected by the facility's
emissions in excess of its permit.

5

In light of Mr. Graham's showing of substantially
affected legal interest, the effect of the Board's
decision is to render meaningless the statutory
intervention provisions of Utah Code Ann. §63-46b--9.
The Court now has the opportunity to reverse the
Board's erroneous ruling, preserve the principle of
intervention, and uphold the legislature's mandate that
citizens be allowed to participate in agency
adjudication and decision-making.

II. Course of the Proceedings and Dispositions Below
On January 13, 2000, Mr. Graham filed his Petition
for Review in this matter seeking review and overturn
of the final order of respondent Utah Air Quality
Board, entered December 21, 1999.

In that order, the

Board denied Mr. Graham's petition to intervene in the
formal adjudicative proceeding before the board
captioned "In the Matter of: Davis Country Solid Waste
Management and Energy Recovery Special Service District

2

"Confusing" and "difficult" are the Board's terms for the
intervention standard. Record at 11, pg. 2 & 10.
6

d/b/a Wasatch Energy Systems (WES)(No. 99030004)"
(hereafter "the WES matter").

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Davis County Garbage Incinerator (d/b/a Wasatch
Energy Systems, a/k/a Davis County Solid Waste
Management and Energy Recovery Special Service
District) (hereafter "Wasatch Energy Systems", or
"WES") operates a municipal waste incinerator.

The

facility and its air emissions are permitted and
regulated by the Utah Department of Environmental
Quality, Division of Air Quality (hereafter "DAQ")
pursuant to Approval Order Number DAQE-850-96
(September 10, 1996).

Wasatch Energy Systems has

repeatedly violated this Approval Order.
The State permit, issued in 1996, prohibits
Wasatch Energy Systems from emitting more than 360
ng/dscm of dioxins and furans into the air.
Furthermore, the permit required the facility to test
for compliance with this dioxin/furan limit in January
or February of 1997.

Initially, Wasatch Energy Systems

failed to submit results of the February test which
7

showed emissions of dioxin/furan at 605.2 and 815,. 3
ng/dscm for stacks A and B respectively. On June 25,
1997, the Board issued a Notice of Violation (hereafter
"June NOV") based on, inter

alia,

WES's failure to

perform the February 1997 dioxin/furan stack test.
WES appealed the June NOV on July 17, 1997,
initiating a formal adjudication under Utah Admin. Code
R307-102-3 (1) (b) . Subsequently, WES submitted a stack
test conducted in October of 1997 which showed an
impermissible dioxin/furan emission level of 379
ng/dscm for stack B. .
Immediately after DAQ issued the June NOV, Mr.
Graham, along with some of his Layton neighbors, began
to explore ways in which they could address the Board
regarding the June NOV.

In early 1998, the Board

finally agreed to include, as part of a routine
meeting, time for Mr. Graham and other residents to
speak about the June NOV.

At the last minute, the

Board altered its agenda to exclude this participation.
Still seeking the opportunity to influence the
Board's resolution of the June NOV, Mr. Graham
attempted to intervene in the relevant formal
8

adjudication, filing his Petition to Intervene in April
1998.
Rather than address Mr. Graham's petition to
intervene, the Board voted on September 9, 1998 to
settle the June NOV with WES pursuant to a Consent
Decree. The Board never reached the merits of Mr.
Graham's petition. The September 1998 consent order had
no substantive provisions, included no fines, and
ignored the October 1997 permit exceedance. Most
importantly, the Board has failed to force the WES to
comply with its permit, via the consent order or any
other action.
The very next stack test performed at the WES
facility showed dioxin/furan emissions in violation of
the permit. A stack test dated September 1998, showed
emissions of 624 ng/dscm from stack A and 685 ng/dscm
from stack B. In response to these impermissible levels
of dioxin/furan emissions from the Wasatch Energy
Systems, but with no apparent sense of urgency, the
Board issued another Notice of Violation on July 9,
1999 (hereafter "July NOV") based on the September 1998
stack test.

In addition to citing the stack test
9

violation, the Board again complained that the facility
had not complied with the stack testing compliance
demonstration requirement of the Approval Order.
On July 30, 1999, Wasatch Energy Systems again
filed an appeal of the NOV3, thereby requesting a
formal proceeding before the Utah Air Quality Board for
the purposes of determining the merits of the notice.
Utah Admin. Code R307-102-3 (1) (b) (1999) ("Appeals 'of
Notices of Violation and Orders shall be processed as
formal proceedings'') .
Experiencing deja vu all over again, Mark Graham
filed a petition to intervene in this second formal
proceeding on September 15, 1999 (In the Matter of:
Davis County Solid Waste Management and Energy Recovery
Special Service District d/b/a Wasatch Energy Systems
(No. 99030004)), pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b9(1996).

Mr. Graham based his petition on, inter

alia,

the following:
a. I live about 2 H miles from the Davis County
Garbage Incinerator owned and operated by the
Davis County Solid Waste Management and Energy
Recovery Special Service District, dba Wasatch
3

Request for Agency Action Vacating Notice of Violation and
Order for Compliance, received August 2, 1999.
10

t?

Energy Systems (Davis County Garbage Incinerator
District).
b. I am concerned about the effect of air emissions
from the incinerator on the air quality and on my
health.
c. I grow vegetables (tomatoes, broccoli) and herbs
in my backyard garden and herbs used for cooking
(basil, peppermint, oregano, sage, thyme). I
also have a bosc pear tree that produces pears
which I eat.
d. The air emissions from the Wasatch Energy Systems
facility are carried by the wind in many
directions, including to my house and garden, and
to Layton and to the Great Salt Lake.
e. I shop, and eat at restaurants, in Layton.
f. I am concerned about enforcement of the Approval
Order issued by State of Utah to the Davis County
Garbage Incinerator District, especially the
emission limits. I am concerned that lack of
strict enforcement of the permit may jeopardize
the air quality and my health.
g. I feel the garbage incinerator facility and its
air emissions threaten the Great Salt Lake. I
love the Great Salt Lake, and I watch birds on
the Lake, which is an important feeding ground
for millions of migratory birds of many
varieties.
Record at 7.
At a December 1, 1999, hearing and in an order
dated December 21, 1999, the Utah Air Quality Board
summarily denied Mr. Graham's petition to intervene
"for the reasons on that day orally assigned."

Record

at 8. Essentially, the Board determined that Mr. Graham
11

did not demonstrate that he had a substantial legal
interest in the outcome of the proceeding. _ld. The
Board based its denial in part on an ill conceived
notion that Mr. Graham must show that he suffered an
"injury or damage specific to himself beyond that which
would occur to the general public." Record at 11, pg.
16.

At the same time, the Board admitted that

permitting Mr. Graham to intervene would not run afoul
of the second part of the intervention inquiry - his
participation would not materially impair efficiency or
effectiveness of the proceeding. Record at 11, pg. 2
(we "don't think the latter of that two-part
[intervention] test is really much of an issue7') .
Mr. Graham seeks immediate judicial review of the
Board's inappropriate denial of his petition to
intervene and refusal to allow him to participate in
decisions affecting the quality of his environment.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
A petition for intervention "shall" be granted if
two conditions are met.

First, the petitioner's "legal

interests" must "be substantially affected by the
12

formal adjudicative proceeding".
46b-9.

Utah Code Ann. §63-

Second, allowing the intervention must not

materially impair the interests of justice and the
orderly and prompt conduct of the adjudicative
proceedings.

Id.

Mr. Graham's petition for

intervention satisfies both of these conditions.
The Utah Air Quality Board improperly denied Mr.
Graham the right to intervene in the administrative
proceeding captioned "In the Matter of: Davis County
Solid Waste Management and Energy Recovery Special
Service District d/b/a Wasatch Energy Systems (No.
99030004)" (hereafter "the WES matter").

Because he is

subjected to WES's excessive and unlawful dioxin/furan
emissions, Mr. Graham's legal interests are
substantially affected by this formal adjudicative
proceeding.

Furthermore, allowing Mr. Graham to

intervene will not materially impair the orderly and
prompt conduct of the adjudicative proceedings. Mr.
Graham therefore should be allowed to intervene.
Moreover, to the extent that the inquiry is
instructive to a determination that Mr. Graham's
interests qualify him to intervene, Mr. Graham also
13

satisfies the criteria to establish standing in this
matter.

Mr. Graham suffered distinct and palpable

injury from the Board's failure to enforce its permit
for the WES facility.

With respect to resolving the

unique issues he raises, Mr. Graham has the greatest
interest of any party.

Furthermore, the unique issues

raised by Mr. Graham are of unique public importance.
Mr. Graham therefore meets the conditions for having
standing to participate in this matter.

14

ARGUMENT
I.

THE UTAH AIR QUALITY BOARD IMPROPERLY DENIED MR.
GRAHAM THE RIGHT TO INTERVENE
Mr. Graham is exactly the type of intervenor the

legislature anticipated should be involved in the
Board's formal adjudication. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b9(2) establishes that the presiding officer "shall"
grant a petition for intervention if he or she
determines that "the petitioner's legal interests may
be substantially affected by the formal adjudicative
proceeding" and "the interests of justice and the
orderly and prompt conduct of the adjudicative
proceedings will not be materially impaired by allowing
the intervention."

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-9(2).

Since Mr. Graham's case satisfies both of these
conditions, the Board should have allowed Mr. Graham to
intervene.
In its Order dated December 21, 1999, the Board
stated that it
finds and concludes that [Mr. Graham's]
concerns, absent other claims or harms
potentially requiring relief or redress for
Mr. Graham specifically, do not constitute
such "legal rights or interests" which "may be
substantially affected" by the instant
15

proceedings as would allow intervention under
Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-9.
Record at 9.
For several reasons, the Board's reasoning is
flawed. First, the Board did not apply the appropriate
standard in making its determination to deny Mr.
Graham's petition to intervene.

As established above,

the Utah Administrative Procedures Act mandates
intervention for any individual who has a substantial
legal interest in the proceeding. Utah Code Ann. §6346b-9(2). The standard says nothing about comparing
these affected interests to the interests of anyone
else and no such comparison is valid. An intervenor
need not distinguish her or his interest from that of
the general public.
Second, even under the standards used by the
Board, Mr. Graham qualifies for intervention - his
interest in the matter is different and more
substantially affected that the interest of the general
public.

As Mr. Graham made clear, he lives but 2 H

miles from the facility and is understandably effected
by WES's unlawful and excessive emissions of cancercausing dioxin/furans.
16

A.

Mr. Graham's Legal Interests Are Substantially
Affected by the Formal Adjudicative Proceeding
Dioxin is incredibly harmful. A cancer

epidemiologist at Boston University's School of Public
Health has called dioxin "the Darth Vader of toxic
chemicals'' due to its widespread harmful effects on
many of the body's systems.

Washington Post, May 17,

at A01, Exhibit "A" attached. In its permit to WES
facility, the state Division of Air Quality has
promulgated maximum levels of dioxin/furan emissions.
Notice of Violation and Order for Compliance, July 9,
1999 at 1 2, Exhibit "C" attached. More recently, the
United States Environmental Protection Agency
reasserted and intensified its assessment of the
serious health risks posed by dioxins and furans and
the harm they pose.

The EPA found the risk of

developing cancer from dioxin "could be as high as 1 in
100", placing the risk "10 times as high as the EPA's
previous projections".

Washington Post, May 17, at

A01, Exhibit "A" attached.
At issue in the formal adjudication before the
board and in the previous proceeding in which Mr.
17

Graham tried to intervene were WES's violations if its
permit and the responsive actions, if any, the state
would take to protect public health and welfare.

In

any case, Mr. Graham is exposed to and affected by
dioxin in unlawful quantities.

Clearly, these

emissions in levels in excess of the permit's
requirements impact Mr. Graham.
As stated in Mr. Graham's affidavit, he lives 2 %
miles from the WES incinerator facility.

Record at 7.

He alleged, and the Board did not contest, that wind
carries the airborne emissions from the incinerator in
many directions, depositing them on Mr. Graham's house
and garden, Layton, and the Great Salt Lake.

_Id. Mr.

Graham not only lives and breathes the air 2 ^ miles
from the WES facility, but he also grows vegetables,
fruit, and herbs in his backyard garden.

Because these

plant products grow under conditions of impermissibly
high dioxin/furan levels, Mr. Graham is exposed to even
higher levels of these carcinogenic chemicals by
consuming the products of his garden.
Mr. Graham also eats local food products such as milk
and cheese produced commercially in the Layton area,
18

one of the most agriculturally productive areas of the
state.

Id. Consuming this food further concentrates

the harmful carcinogens unlawfully emitted from the WES
facility in Mr. Graham's body, directly harming him and
greatly increasing his risk of cancer. Washington Post,
May 17, at A01, Exhibit "A" attached.
Furthermore, as stated in his affidavit, Mr.
Graham watches and appreciates birds on the Great Salt
Lake and its tributary streams, important feeding
grounds and rest stops for millions of migratory and
resident birds.

Record at 7.

The food eaten by these

birds includes plants and fish, organisms that
similarly develop under dangerously high levels of
dioxins and furans.

Through operation of the food

consumer pyramid, this passes even higher
concentrations of carcinogens on to upper-level
consumer species.

Such levels pose a serious harm to

the birds whose presence and good health Mr. Graham
values.
Furthermore, in instructive federal cases,
impermissibly excessive emissions by industrial
combustion facilities such as incinerators and
19

refineries have been found to cause injury in fact to
citizens living in their vicinities where they
"impaired the quality of the air that plaintiffs
breathed".

Anderson v. Farmland Industries, Inc., 70

F.Supp.2d 1218, 1222 (D.Kan. 1999).

Federal courts

have also held that exposure to unlawfully unclean air
per

se qualifies as injury.

See,

e.g., Natural

Resources Defense Council v. United States
Environmental Protection Agency, 507 F.2d 905 (9th Cir.
1974).

In NRDC v. EPA, the court found injury to the

plaintiff Abbuhl merely because he was a resident of
the state for which the EPA approved an implementation
plan: • "There is no doubt, however, that Dr. Abbuhl, as
a resident of Arizona, will suffer injury if compelled
to breathe air less pure than that mandated by the
Clean Air Act." NRDC v. EPA, 507 F.2d at 910. Mr. Graham's claim of injury is even clearer than
that in NRDC insofar as he lives only 2 ^ miles from
the polluting facility.

Similar to the injury suffered

by Dr. Abbuhl, Mr. Graham is subject to WES's
dioxin/furan excessive and unlawful emissions
violations which impaired the quality of the air that
20

he breathes.

Moreover, WESfs violations impaired the

quality of the edible plants Mr. Graham grows. WES's
emissions standards violations therefore clearly cause
injury in fact to Mr. Graham.
Furthermore, the legislature has determined that
violation of a permit itself causes injury.

The

legislature has also determined that enforcement of
permits is necessary to protect public health and the
environment.

As stated in the Air Conservation Act,

[i]t is the policy of this state and the
purpose of this chapter to achieve and
maintain levels of air quality which will
protect human health and safety, and to the
greatest degree practicable, prevent injury to
plant and animal life and property, [and]
foster the comfort and convenience of the
people.
Utah Code § 19-2-101(2).

One of the State's key tools

for achieving this purpose is the enforcement of
permits, such as the Approval Order for WES.
Code Ann. § 19-2-109.

E.g.

Utah

The seriousness with which the

legislature takes permit violations is demonstrated by
penalty provisions in the Air Conservation Act, which
sets civil penalties of up to $50,000 per day for each
violation and establishes criminal penalties for
willful permit violations.

See Utah Code § 19-2-115(2)
21

(establishing a $10,000 per day fine for permit
violations); Utah Code § 19-2-115(5) (making a willful
permit violation a misdemeanor).
Finally, Mr. Graham's interest is substantially
affected by the proceeding before the Board.

If the

Board allows WES to continue to release dioxin or fails
to force WES to conform to the emissions limits
contained in its permit, then Mr. Graham will continue
to be harmed as detailed above.

Even the Board's

failure to attempt to deter WES from future emission
violations will result in continued harm to Mr. Graham.
Furthermore, if the Board had allowed Mr. Graham
to intervene, the parties might have reached a more
favorable result with respect to Mr. Graham's health
and safety.

For example, had the Board permitted Mr.

Graham's participation, he might been able to persuade
it to incorporate into the settlement his concerns, as
shared by the United States Environmental Protection
Agency.

Both Mr. Graham and the federal agency have

serious objections to the resolution of the July NOV
embodied in the settlement agreement. Letter from Ron
Rutherford, Acting Director, Technical Enforcement,
22

Office of Enforcement, Compliance and Environmental
Justice, US EPA, to Ursula Kramer, Executive Secretary,
Utah Air Quality Board, March 3, 2000, Exhibit "D"
attached.

Based on the possibility of affecting the

proceeding, Mr. Graham satisfies the prong of the
statutory test for intervention contained in Utah Code
Ann. §63-46b-9(2) that is before the court in this
matter.

B.

Allowing the Intervention Will Not Materially
Impair the Orderly and Prompt Conduct of the
Adjudicative Proceedings
Oddly, even though Mr. Graham satisfies both of

the conditions for granting an intervention, the Board
denied his petition.

While the Board's Order seems to

rely on the conclusion that Mr. Graham's legal rights
are not substantially affected by the administrative
proceeding, the Board's discussion also focused on
concerns of setting a precedent of allowing
interventions.

Record at 11, pg 13.

The Board's argument rejecting Mr. Graham's
petition for intervention is unsound and - ironically leads to bad legal precedent the Board wished to avoid.
23

Following the Board's reasoning, if Mr. Graham is not
allowed to intervene, then no one would be allowed to
intervene.

This would prevent any citizen, no matter

how affected by permit violations, from fully
participating in the formal adjudication affecting air
quality.

Such nihilistic logic destroys the very

concept of intervention in such cases.
The Supreme Court of Utah has recognized the folly
of such a path: "To disallow intervention in this case
would justify disallowing it in every case and render
the intervention statute a nullity."

Millard County v.

Utah State Tax Commission, 823 P.2d 459, 463 (Utah
1991).

Similarly, denying Mr. Graham's petition for

intervention would justify denying all petitions for
intervention in every such case, thus eviscerating the
statutory intervention provisions of Utah Code Ann.
§63-46b-9.
Intervention should not be denied on the grounds
that many members of the public might qualify to
intervene.

Highly relevant to the present case is

Millard County, 823 P.2d 459. In Millard County, the
Tax Commission's order denying Millard County's
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petition to intervene was reversed because the Tax
Commission improperly denied Millard County's right to
intervention.

The Utah Supreme Court found that the

County had met both the statute's and the Commission's
requirements for intervention.

Millard County at 463.

The County sought intervention in a proceeding
before the Commission to determine the tax liability of
Intermountain Power Agency ("IPA"), a major taxpayer.
In its denial of the County's petition for
intervention, the Commission voiced concerns that
allowing the County to intervene would extend the right
to intervene to hundreds of other taxing districts.
Because the Commission believed that allowing the
County's intervention would "create an administrative
nightmare, greatly increas[ing] the cost of
administering the system," and "clog[ging] the entire
system including the appeal and hearing system".
Millard County at 4 62.

The County concluded that the

interests of justice and the orderly and prompt conduct
of the proceedings would be impaired by intervention.
The Millard County court found that the Commission's
conclusion was not realistic.
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Millard County at 463.

In rejecting this argument, the Utah Supreme Court
notes that what matters to the intervention inquiry is
that the County did have a protected legal interest in
the matter: "Its participation in the proceedings may
have resulted in a different, more favorable settlement
of IPA's tax liability."

Millard County at 463.

Similarly, in the instant case, Mr. Graham's
participation in the formal adjudication might have
resulted in a more favorable settlement of the issue of
WES's permit violations concerning public health. Mr.
Graham therefore qualifies for intervention under the
Millard County test.
Even if it were relevant to the present inquiry,
the suggestion that Mr. Graham's are common to the
public at large is plainly wrong.

Because Mr. Graham

lives practically in the shadow of the WES facility,
his interest in this matter is greater than that of his
neighbors and other local residents of the Wasatch
Front who live and work farther away from the facility.
Furthermore, if Mr. Graham were just like everyone
else, the holding in Millard County dictates that
interveners must still be given the opportunity to
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participate.

In that case, the Court noted that while

allowing intervention may complicate proceedings to a
degree, the agency should devise procedures to minimize
the burden without undermining the right of local
entities to intervene where appropriate.

Id.

If

intervention and full participation of numerous
similarly situated entities would be unduly burdensome
to the agency, the Commission should, for example,
allow one local entity to act on behalf of other
similarly situated entities.
When there is an identity of interests among a
number of taxing agencies, it is unlikely, in
any event, that multiple interventions would
be sought. Even if they were, the interests
of the agencies can be adequately accommodated
in most instances by a procedure that allows
one party, or perhaps a few, to act on behalf
of others.
Millard County at 462.
In cases like that of Mr. Graham, granting an
intervention does not require the court to examine any
issues extraneous to the initial inquiry; in fact,
allowing the intervention gives the court access to a
different perspective not originally included.

In

Millard County, the court noted that the tax assessment
in dispute in that matter necessarily turned on facts
27

and legal issues that were identical with respect to
the County and the Commission, and that therefore
allowing the County to intervene would be proper.
Similarly, in Mr. Graham's case, the permit violation
in dispute necessarily turns on facts and legal issues
that are identical with respect to Mr. Graham and the
Board: namely, the harmful dioxin/furan emissions in
violation of WES's permit.

Because Mr. Graham thereby

satisfies both of the statutory elements for
intervention under Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-9, his
petition to intervene should have been granted by the
Board.

II. MR. GRAHAM HAS STANDING TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS
MATTER.
While the proper standards for granting
intervention are codified in Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-9,
the Board seems also to have considered issues of
standing.

To the extent that the standards for

standing are the proper criteria for granting an
intervention, Mr. Graham also qualifies to have
standing in this matter.

Utah's doctrine of standing

is intended to allow access to courts to redress injury
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while ensuring the procedural integrity of judicial
adjudications.

This is achieved by requiring all

parties to a lawsuit to have both sufficient interest
in the subject matter of the dispute and sufficient
adverseness that the disputed issues will be completely
explored.
1983).

Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1150 (Utah

See also

Terracor v. Utah Board of State Lands

& Forestry, 716 P.2d 796, 798 (Utah 1986).

This

doctrine arises from the general principles of
separation of powers established in Article V of the
Utah Constitution.

Id.

The courts are therefore

limited to resolving "crystallized disputes concerning
specific factual situations."

Id. at 799.

The Supreme Court of Utah has referred to three
general standards for determining whether a litigant
has standing.
1983).

See Jenkins, 675 P.2d at 1150 (Utah

If any of these conditions are met, the

litigant must be allowed access to the courts.

Id.

The first general criterion is that the plaintiff must
demonstrate "some distinct and palpable injury that
gives him [or her] a personal stake in the outcome of
the legal dispute."

Terracor, 716 P.2d at 799 (quoting
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Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d at 1150) . Second, if the
plaintiff does not meet the first criterion, he or she
has standing "if no one else has a greater interest in
the outcome of the case and the issues are unlikely to
be raised at all unless that particular plaintiff has
standing to raise the issue."
799.

Terracor, 716 P.2d at

Third, a plaintiff who meets neither of the above

criteria nonetheless has standing "if the issues are
unique and of such great importance that they ought to
be decided in furtherance of the public interest".

A*

Id.

Mr. Graham Suffers Distinct and Palpable Injury
From the Board's Failure to Enforce WES's Permit
The first prong of the Jenkins standing inquiry

requires distinct and palpable injury to the plaintiff
as well as a causal relationship between that injury
and the agency's actions.

The first and most widely used standard to
show standing requires a plaintiff to show
some distinct and palpable injury that gives
rise to a personal stake in the outcome of the
dispute... A mere allegation of adverse impact
is not sufficient; there must also be some
causal relationship between the injury to the
plaintiff and the governmental actions.
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Sierra Club v. Dept. of Env. Quality, 857 P.2d
982, 986 (Utah App. 1993)(citing Jenkins at 1150).
As detailed above, Mr. Graham's exposure to
dioxin constitutes distinct and palpable injury
giving rise to a personal stake in the outcome of
the WES matter.

As stated in his affidavit, he

lives but 2 H miles from the incinerator, and eats
locally raised foods both from his garden and from
local dairies and agricultural enterprises.
Record at 7.

Both WES's repeated permit

violations and the very pollution itself cause Mr.
Graham injury in fact.
Furthermore, there is a causal relationship
between the injury to Mr. Graham and the Board's
actions.

By refusing to enforce the terms of

WES's State permit, the Board causes and allows
the injury to Mr. Graham to continue. Mr.
Graham's participation may influence the
adjudication toward a more favorable resolution indeed, a resolution that reflects the serious
concerns that he and the US EPA share regarding
the settlement of the July NOV.
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Exhibit "D"

attached. Such a causal relationship satisfies the
second requirement of the first Jenkins inquiry.

B.

Mr. Graham Has the Greatest Interest and Raises
Unique Issues
Even supposing Mr. Graham does not qualify for

standing under the first test, he still qualifies under
the two-part second Jenkins test.
[I]f the aggrieved party does not have
standing under the first part, a court may
still grant standing if there is no other
party who has a greater interest in the
outcome of the case than the aggrieved party
and if the issue is unlikely to be raised at
all if standing is denied.
Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & Esplin v. D.E.S., 878 P.2d
1191, 1194 (Utah App. 1994) (citing Jenkins).
The first element of this second Jenkins test is
being the most appropriate plaintiff.

In Jenkins,

where Jenkins challenged the several educational and
legislative systems within the state, he lacked
standing because he did not live in any of the
geographic areas whose systems he challenged:
"Jenkins' interest is less direct than the interest of
those living in the relevant school districts or
legislative districts."

Jenkins, 675 P.2d at 1151.
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Mr. Graham's case differs markedly from that of Jenkins
- Mr. Graham lives in the geographic area directly
affected by WES's continued harmful and unlawful
emissions.

Applying the second Jenkins test to the

facts of Mr. Graham's case, Mr. Graham raises issues
relevant to a resident living near the incinerator
which are different from the issues raised by the
state.

Mr. Graham therefore qualifies as the "most

appropriate plaintiff" in this matter and therefore
meets the first element of the second Jenkins test.
In Sierra Club/ the court applied the second
Jenkins test to a different set of facts.

There, the

Sierra Club sought to review a state agency's approval
of a commercial hazardous waste incinerator project.
Standing was not granted because the court found the
environmental group not to be the most appropriate
plaintiff.

However, the court's reasoning in Sierra

Club demonstrates that Mr. Graham is just the sort of
plaintiff that is the most appropriate:
Sierra Club is not the most appropriate
plaintiff to challenge the Board's decision...
[Appropriate plaintiffs with a greater
interest in this dispute might include
emergency response personnel, other persons
working in the area of the proposed CIF,
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owners of property near the site, or public or
private entities located in proximity to the
site.
Sierra Club; 857 P.2d at 987 (emphasis added).
Mr. Graham is easily distinguishable from the
Sierra Club as a plaintiff.

Unlike the Sierra Club,

Mr. Graham owns property and resides 2 H miles from the
incinerator site in this matter.

He is among the

entities highlighted in Sierra Club as appropriate
plaintiffs.

This clearly satisfies the proximity

requirement embodied in the Sierra Club opinion.

If

Mr. Graham does not live sufficiently close to the
incinerator site to qualify as the most appropriate
plaintiff, then neither could practically any other
person.

He will provide to the adjudication the

perspective of one who cares about air quality and its
impact.

Unlike the state, Mr. Graham need not balance

issues of economics and with health-related concerns.
These issues and this perspective will not be raised
without his participation.

Mr. Graham therefore

satisfies the first element of the second Jenkins
approach to standing.
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Furthermore, for these reasons, the issues Mr.
Graham seeks to raise are unlikely to be raised if Mr.
Graham is denied standing.

This is the second

essential component of the second Jenkins test for
standing: "Even if a plaintiff cannot show that it
suffered some distinct injury, standing may still be
established if no other plaintiff has a greater
interest in the outcome and if the issue is unlikely to
be raised at all if the plaintiff is denied standing."
Jenkins, 675 P.2d at 1150.

See also

Sierra Club, 857

P.2d at 987 (following the Jenkins test).

Mr. Graham

should therefore be granted standing based on being the
most appropriate plaintiff to represent his interests
in this matter.

C.

Mr. Graham Raises Unique Issues of Great Public
Importance
Even if Mr. Graham does not qualify for standing

under the first two Jenkins tests, he does qualify for
standing under the third, "public importance" test.
Under this approach, standing is granted where the
plaintiff raises unique issues of great public
importance.
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In Sierra Club, the court considered this means of
granting standing.

"Sierra Club would nonetheless have

standing if the issues presented are ^unique and of
such great public importance that they ought to be
decided in furtherance of the public interest'."
Sierra Club, 857 P.2d at 987 (quoting Terracor v. Utah
Bd. of State Lands & Forestry, 716 P.2d at 799 ). See
also National Parks and Conservation Association v.
Board of State Lands, 869 P.2d 909, 913 (Utah
1993)(finding standing for an environmental group
challenging transfer of state land within national park
to county).

However, in Sierra Club, where future

public involvement was upcoming in the agency's own
procedures, the court found that the issues raised were
not of great public important and therefore declined to
grant standing to the plaintiff.
Sierra Club is challenging determinations by
the Board that constitute internal procedural
decisions preceding any public involvement in
the permit process. The issues, at this
stage, are not of great public importance and
it is not in the public interest to seek
review of the Board's internal operating
procedures.
Sierra Club, 857 P.2d at 987.
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Mr. Graham, on the other hand, raises unique
issues of public importance which the Board refuses to
consider in a meaningful matter.

No other party in the

matter raises the unique issues of the harms to local
residents caused by the WES incinerator's illegal and
excessive emissions violations.

The dramatically

increased risk to the public of cancer and other
disease posed by exposure to the impermissibly high
levels of carcinogens emitted by the WES facility is
certainly an issue of great public interest.

The

facility's unwillingness and/or inability to comply
with its permit, and the State's response to this
situation, are also matters of great public importance.
Mr. Graham therefore qualifies under the third Jenkins
test because he raises unique issues of great public
importance.
Thus, to the extent that the standing inquiry is
instructive here, Mr. Graham qualifies for standing
under any of the three Jenkins tests.

This strongly

suggests that Mr. Graham's petition for intervention in
the administrative proceeding should be granted.
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CONCLUSION
By denying Mr. Graham the right to intervene in
the WES matter, the Board violated its duty under Utah
Code Ann. §63-46b-9.

In that provision, the

legislature clearly envisioned that affected citizens
like Mr. Graham would and should be allowed the
opportunity to influence agency adjudication.

Mr.

Graham meets the legislature's criteria for
intervention - his legal interests are substantially
affected by the proceeding before the Board.

His

concerns about his own health and the well-being of the
Great Salt Lake ecosystem entitle him to participate in
the proceeding dealing with WES's unlawful emissions of
toxic dioxins. Allowing the intervention will not
materially impair the interests of justice and the
orderly and prompt conduct of the adjudicative
proceedings.

Mr. Graham is concerned only with the

issues before the Board - WES's permit violations and
the State's response to those violations.

Because Mr.

Graham meets both of the statutory criteria for the
mandatory granting of a petition for intervention, the
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Utah Air Quality Board improperly denied Mr. Graham the
right to intervene.

The Board's decision to deny Mr.

Graham's petition to intervene should be overturned,
and Mr. Graham's petition should be granted.
Furthermore, insofar as inquiry into standing is
informative here, Mr. Graham qualifies to have standing
to participate in the adjudicative proceeding
concerning the WES incinerator facility's violations of
its emissions standards.

Mr. Graham suffers distinct

and palpable injury from WES's permit violations, and
should be involved in the Board's handling of those
violations.

If WES is sufficiently deterred from

violating the appropriate dioxin/furan standards
contained in the Approval Order, these harmful
carcinogens will continue to harm and cause injury in
fact to Mr. Graham.

Mr. Graham's proximity to the

facility gives him at least as great an interest in the
proceeding as any other party.

With respect to the

particular and relevant issues that he raises, Mr.
Graham has the greatest interest of any party in this
matter.

Finally, Mr. Graham raises unique issues of

great public importance.

While Mr. Graham is most
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directly injured by the WES facility's unlawful permit
violations because of his closeness to the incinerator,
the polluting of the heavily populated Wasatch Front
and the critical Great Salt Lake ecosystem with deadly
carcinogens is certainly a matter of great public
importance.

The fact that Mr. Graham qualifies to have

standing to participate in this matter further compels
a finding of intervenor status. Because all factors
indicate that Mr. Graham is entitled to intervene, the
Board's decision to deny Mr. Graham's petition to
intervene should be overturned, and Mr. Graham's
petition should be granted.

40

th

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this 17ca day of July,
2000.

JORO W W
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER
MARK GRAHAM
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
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I hereby certify that on the 17cn day of JULY 2000,
I caused to be mailed copies of the above and foregoing
pleading appellant Mark Graham's Brief of Petitioner
with attachments to:

Richard Rathbun
Fred Nelson
Assistant Attorneys General
160 East 300 South Street, 5th Floor
PO Box 140873
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0873
Larry Jenkins
500 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah

84111

JORO WALKER
ATTORNEY FOR^PETITIONER
MARK GRAHAM
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The Utah Air Quality Board
In the matter of

I

Petition to Intervene

Wasatch Energy Systems

No. 99030004

Petitioner Mark E. Graham submits this Petition to Intervene in the above matter pursuant to
Utah Code 63-46b-9.
Statement of facts demonstrating that the Petitioner's legal rights or interests are substantially
affected by the formal adjudicative proceeding, or that the petitioner qualifies as an intervenor
under any provision of law:
In this matter the Utah Air Quality Board finds Wasatch Energy Systems (the Davis County
Garbage Incinerator District, or the "District") in violation of the emission limits and compliance
demonstration requirement stated as Conditions 7 and 8 of the Approval Order issued September
10, 1996 to the source, and orders the source to "immediately initiate all actions necessary to
achieve total compliance with all applicable provisions of the [Utah Air Conservation] Act."
Further, the Board orders the source to "notify this office in writing on or before the 15th day of
receipt of this letter of W.E.S.' intent to comply with this ORDER and indicate the date(s) on
which W.E.S. will again perform stack testing at both the Unit A and the Unit B Discharge
Points of the Bi-Flue Stack to demonstrate that compliance with the dioxin furan emission limit
found in Condition 7 of the A.O. dated September 10,1996 has been achieved." (Notice of
Violation and Order for Compliance, issued by Utah Air Quality Board Executive Secretary
Ursula Trueman on July 9,1999, at 2)
In a written reply dated July 16,1999 pursuant to the ORDER, the source failed to state its intent
to comply with the order, failed to indicate what action, if any, it would take to achieve
compliance with all applicable provisions of the Utah Air Conservation Act and the emission
limits in its permit, and instead argued for the Board to accept a December, 1998 stack test and
ignore and forget the September, 1998 stack test.
In a written "Request for Agency Action Vacating Notice of Violation and Order for
Compliance" dated July 30, 1999, the source disputes the validity of the September 15-17,1998
stack test, which provided the evidence of violation used as the basis for the N.O.V.O.T.C.,
suggests a later (December, 1998) stack test which was not approved or accepted by the
Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) ought to be accepted, disputes the legal authority
of the Utah Air Quality Board to issue or enforce the Approval Order as written, and once again
cites a disputed, industry-provided "health risk assessment", totally irrelevant to the Approval
Order, as evidence of the safety of burning garbage in a residential area.
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Simply put, Petitioner has a legal right and interest, as do other local residents, in having the
Utah Air Quality Board enforce the Approval Order and the emission limits and compliance
demonstration requirement therein. It is a matter of air quality and public health. The
Legislature passed the Act to protect air quality and public health. Title 19, Chapter 2, the Utah
Air Conservation Act, established the Utah Air Quality Board and gave it the authority to issue
permits with emission limits. The Utah Rules contain 4 separate categories of violations of
varying severity and corresponding ranges of monetary penalties. Monetary penalties can have a
deterrent effect on future air pollution. Furthermore, written and legally binding Orders from the
Utah Air Quality Board have the force of law and can cause a source to take steps necessary to
reduce air emissions to the environment.
Also, the Approval Order from September 10, 1996 was issued pursuant to the Utah State
Implementation Plan and therefore is enforceable under the federal Clean Air Act as amended.
Petitioner has a legal right & interest in having the Clean Air Act enforced.
Petitioner sought to intervene in a similar matter before pursuant to Utah Code 63-46b-9, namely
Utah Air Quality Board v. Wasatch Energy Systems, which originated with a June 25, 1997
Notice of Violation and Order for Compliance. Petitioner was never allowed to intervene in that
matter, not because the Board chose to deny the Petition to Intervene which Petitioner submitted
in about April, 1998, but because somebody at Air Quality either forgot or neglected to include
Petitioner's written brief on his standing to intervene with the packet of information sent to
Board members in July, 1998. That matter was settled before the Board ever addressed even
allowing or not allowing that Petition.
If the source's appeal / request for agency action is granted, it will have the following effects:
1) Dioxin emissions in excess of the emission limit set in the Approval Order will continue,
with the continuing long term negative consequences for air quality and public health.
2) The Utah Air Conservation Act, the Approval Order, and Notice of Violation and Order for
Compliance will not be enforced. Petitioner has a legal right and interest that all of the above
should be and must be enforced.
3) A precedent will be set for this source and others statewide that written Orders from the
Board can be circumvented via sufficiently intense, spirited and aggressive legal posturing
and maneuvering, once again thwarting the interests of the Utah Legislature in protecting air
quality and public health. Other sources will be tempted to follow this course of action.
Wasatch Energy Systems' consultant, Greg Rigo of Rigo & Rigo Associates, Inc. has submitted
a report to the State dated January, 1999 on the expected relationship between dioxin/furan
emissions and flue gas temperature as it enters the air pollution control system. This report
provides the "scientific" basis for Wasatch Energy Systems' challenge and appeal and Request
for Agency Action. However, Figures 7 and 8 in that report, on page 18, do not say what the
District wants them to. The District implies there is an inverse relationship between dioxin/ftiran
stack concentrations and flue gas inlet temperatures, but the data do not show this relationship to
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be as strong as suggested, let alone strong enough to contradict the results of a properly and
carefully performed stack test. Figure 7 shows dozens of data points, most of which are far from
the line which has been drawn on the graph, supposedly as the best fit line. The standard
deviation of this data set and this relationship is huge. The large number of data points lying a
long way from the line proves that the supposed relationship does not exist or is not as reliable,
pronounced, and distinct as the District claims.
If the Board accepts this argument about dioxin/furan emission rates and flue gas temperature,
and their relationship, and vacates the N.O.V.O.T.C. based on it, then the Board will have ceased
to regulated dioxin/fiiran emissions directly, and will have begun to regulate dioxin/furan
emissions by proxy only, the proxy being A.P.C.S. inlet temperature. This is contrary to the
plain language of the Approval Order. Furthermore, such an interpretation amounts to a
modification of the Approval Order, which cannot be stipulated by the Board. If the Board
wishes to modify the Approval Order it must follow the formal procedures including public
comment and hearing as specified in the Utah Air Conservation Act.
Relief sought by Petitioner:
1) Strict enforcement of the Utah Air Conservation Act, the Approval Order, and Notice of
Violation and Order for Compliance, each and every one of them, including but not limited
to:
a) fines appropriate to the violation(s)
b) a Written Order from the Utah Air Quality Board to the source to cause the source to take
concrete action in terms of pollution control equipment or operational procedures or
filtering out certain waste, or a combination of the above, in order to reduce dioxin
emissions to below the permitted level
c) a Written Declaratory Order from the Utah Air Quality Board on the accuracy,
interpretation, and understanding of stack tests (air emissions tests) particularly Method
23 and any other tests used for dioxin emissions, including grounds on which such a test
can be challenged in the future
d) A finding of whether, in light of the arguments raised by the source, there was a violation
of either Condition 7 or Condition 8 of the Approval Order dated September 10,1996, in
September, 1998, and the specific reasons why or why not in each case.
e) A written resolution of the legal argument raised by the source based on the "more
stringent rule" limitation on the power of the Board, found at page 6 of the source's
Request for Agency Action. A written request to the Utah Attorney General to clarify the
meaning and applicability of this provision.
f) A written resolution of the supposed relationship between dioxin emission levels and
temperature levels at garbage incinerators (municipal solid waste incinerators) of this
type, which the source raised in is Request for Agency Action and in a separate report
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submitted to the Board by Greg Rigo of Rigo & Rigo Associates, Inc. and how the Board
uses that relationship, if at all, to assess apparent dioxin emission violations.
g) A written clarification of the notice requirement, if any, applicable to "retests", and when
a stack test is considered a "test" versus when it is considered a "retest". If notice
requirements are different for "tests" and "retests", a statement of the logical, scientific,
and regulatory basis for that difference. If the Board did not intend any meaningful
difference between the terms "test" and "retest", a written statement clarifying the
Board's intent.
h) A written finding that the source has failed to state its intent to comply with the Order
within the given time limit.
*

i) A written statement that neither the Division of Air Quality nor the Board has imposed a
gag order on DAQ employees to prevent them from speaking to the media or the general
public. The District is apparently under the impression that at one time such a gag order
was imposed or promised or intended, and this misunderstanding has caused problems
with some DAQ employees' communications with the media and the general public.
j) A written statement from the Board that based on the professional opinions of the staff of
the Division of Air Quality, and the "second opinion" provided by the Utah Division of
Solid and Hazardous Waste, and given the lack of any statement from either the sampling
company (Air Pollution Testing, Inc. of Wheat Ridge, CO) or the analytical company
(Phillips Analytical Services of Ontario, Canada) that anything went wrong at any point
in the stack test process, the evidence available proves there was a violation of the
dioxin/furan emission limit in the September 15-17, 1998 stack test.
2) such other relief as the Board may feel is appropriate.
This source has succeeded in avoiding even one dollar of fines from the Board since early 1992.
Yet the record shows this is not the result of clean and legal operations, but of repeated violations
followed in every instance by aggressive, intense appeals, disputing, contesting, and fighting the
permit. The Board should be aware that the District has a vested financial interest in doing so,
and in causing the Board to back down not partially but totally, on this and future
N.O. V.O.T.C.s. Such a vested financial interest arises from a promise which the District made to
the Trustee representing the holders of its $28 million in bonds. The bond covenant includes the
promise that following each fiscal year through 2006, the District will make a Written
Certification to the Trustee that "the facility and the landfill were operated in compliance with all
applicable federal, state and local rules, regulations, and laws
" The ultimate threat to the
District presented by this N.O.V.O.T.C. is that it will be unable to make that Written
Certification in about August, 2000. The District may default, however technically, on its bond
covenant and face a lower bond rating. Such a vested financial interest drives the District's
intense opposition to enforcement of the Utah Air Conservation Act, the A.O., the N.O.V.O.T.C,
and the emission limits therein, even in the face of clear evidence of a violation.
i
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Knowing that the Board was faced with a very similar enforcement action in 1997-98, and
indeed some of the exact same issues (the "no stricter rule" for example) were raised by the
District at the time, and knowing that despite written objections from about 3 dozen local citizens
the Board approved a Stipulation and Consent Order on September 9,1998, which avoided and
failed to resolve all of the major issues, and omitted any penalties, and failed to state whether
there had even been a violation in February, April, or October, 1997, and knowing that the
September, 1998 stack test revealed dioxin/furan emissions about 80% over the emission limits
in the Approval Order, one can draw the obvious and correct conclusion. The Board has failed
to enforce the Act and the A.O. in the past and has failed to require the District to reduce its
dioxin emissions.
A democracy works best, if at all, when the public interest is strongly and consistently put at the
top of the agenda of all branches of government. Negotiations behind closed doors are
inherently non-public, and leave a great opportunity for the public interest to either be of
secondary importance or not important at all. The source has aggressively challenged
enforcement actions such as this in the past (1997-98) and succeeded in undermining
enforcement of the Act, the A.O., the N.O.V.O.T.C, and avoided having to reduce its air
pollution. This is an unacceptable outcome of the regulatory process. Citizen input should be
encouraged, and allowed in the form of this Petition to Intervene.
Thank you.

s\

Mark E. Graham
Layton, Utah
Davis County
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Affidavit of Mark E. Graham
1) I, Mark E. Graham, am at least 18 years of age.
2) I live at 2211 East 1200 North, Layton, Utah 84040
3) I live about 2 Vz miles from the Davis County Garbage Incinerator owned and operated by the
Davis County Solid Waste Management and Energy Recovery Special Service District, dba
Wasatch Energy Systems (Davis County Garbage Incinerator District).
4) I am concerned about the effect .of air emissions from the incinerator on the air quality and on
my health.
5) I grow vegetables (tomatoes, broccoli) and herbs in my backyard garden and herbs used for
cooking (basil, peppermint, oregano, sage, thyme). I also have a bosc pear tree which
produces pears which I eat.
6) The air emissions from the garbage incinerator are carried by the wind in many directions,
including to my house and garden, and to Layton and to the Great Salt Lake.
7) I shop, and eat at restaurants, in Layton.
8) I am concerned about enforcement of the Approval Order issued by State of Utah to the
Davis County Garbage Incinerator District, especially the emission limits. I am concerned
that lack of strict enforcement of the permit may jeopardize the air quality and my health.
9) An employee of the Division of Air Quality has told me, 'The most important science in
political science." Unfortunately, it seems (and I believe) that this statement accurately
captures the state of the State's efforts, such as they are, to enforce the emission limits which
it has set for this source.
10) I feel the garbage incinerator facility and its air emissions threaten the Great Salt Lake. I
love the Great Salt Lake, and I watch birds on the Lake, which is an important feeding
ground for millions of migratory birds of many varieties.
Signed,

VMA
Mark E. Graham
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BEFORE THE UTAH AIR QUALITY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF:
DAVIS COUNTY SOLID WASTE
MANAGEMENT AND ENERGY
RECOVERY SPECIAL SERVICE
DISTRICT d/b/a
WASATCH ENERGY SYSTEMS

ORDER

No. 99030004

This matter came before the Utah Air Quality Board ("Board") on December 1,1999 on
Mark Graham's Petition to Intervene. Richard Armstrong appeared on behalf of Wasatch Energy
Systems, Fred Nelson represented the Executive Secretary and the Division of Air Quality, and
Mark Graham appeared on his own behalf. A quorum of Board members was present and voted.
The Board's consideration of the Petition to Intervene was conducted under the authority of Utah
Code Ann. § 63-46b-9 (1953, as amended).
The Board, having reviewed the record in this matter, and upon consideration of the
pleadings and attachments, arguments of the parties and facts presented to the Board, voted to
deny the Petition to Intervene, for the reasons on that day orally assigned. The Board hereby
issues its written order as required by the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann. §
63-46b-l etseq.
The Board finds and concludes that Mr. Graham has failed to present evidence
demonstrating that intervention is proper under the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-9.

Mr. Graham expressed in his petition, attachments and arguments to the Board his interest in
seeing enforcement of the approval order and in prevention against environmental degradation
generally. The Board finds and concludes that these concerns, absent other claims or harms
potentially requiring relief or redress for Mr. Graham specifically, do not constitute such "legal
rights or interests" which "may be substantially affected" by the instant proceedings as would
allow intervention under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-9. Accordingly:
IT IS ORDERED that the Petition to Intervene by Mark Graham is hereby denied.
Dated this ^ /

day of December, 1999.

Utah Air Quality Board

Notice of the Right to Apply for Reconsideration or Review
Within 20 days after the date that a final order is signed in this matter by the Utah Air
Quality Board, any party shall have the right to apply for reconsideration with the Board,
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13. The request for reconsideration should state the
specific grounds upon which relief is requested and should be submitted in writing to the Board
at 150 North 1950 West, P.O. Box 144820, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-4820. A copy of the

,

request must be mailed to each party by the person making the request. The filing of a request
for reconsideration is not a prerequisite for seeking judicial review of an order.
(

A

Notice of the Right to Petition for Judicial Review
Judicial review of this Order may be sought in the Utah Court of Appeals under Utah
Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 and the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure by the filing of a proper
petition within thirty days after the date of this Order.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be MAILED a true and correct copy of the foregoing
ORDER this Z P ^ d a y of December, 1999 to the following:
Mark Graham
2211 East 1200 North
Layton, Utah 84040
Larry S. Jenkins
Richard Armstrong
Wood Crapo, LLC.
500 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Fred G Nelson
Utah Attorney General's Office
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor
P.O. Box 140873
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144-0873
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PROCEEDINGS OF THE DECEMBER 1,1999
UTAH AIR QUALITY BOARD MEETING

Richard Rathbun: Mr. Chairman, I'm Richard Rathbun with the Attorney General's Office and Fred

8

asked me to represent the Board on this matter today and I will act as Board counsel. I've had the

9

pleasure of doing so with the Solid and Hazardous Waste Board for several years, but I know it's been

10

quite a few years since I've heard before the Air Quality Board, so it's a pleasure to be here. Basically,

11

I'm here to act as Board counsel and answer your questions on this procedural issue which you have to

12

decide today. But if I could take just a few minutes, I want to just give you an overview.

13

As Mr. Nelson mentioned, what's before you basically is two items: One is the petition to intervene, the

14

other is a scheduling matter—the schedule for discovery and the hearing and also the question of the

15

appointing of the hearing officer. The more difficult one, I think, is the first though, and that is the

16

petition to intervene. I'm sure you've seen the petition; it was filed by Mr. Graham and let me just

17

mention as an aside, as Board counsel I try very hard to act strictly as a neutral advisor to the Board, not

18

as an advocate for one side or the other on this decision, or on this point. So, please I want to just lay it

19

out in as objective a manner as I can. Still, we get into some discussion of the facts in the law and so I

20

will try to keep it brief, as brief as possible. But I want to give you a little outline of the issue.

21

Basically, a petition to intervene is fairly common in litigation. It's also something that we have seen

22

before in the administrative procedures setting. It asks that, in this case, a non-party to the formal

23

proceeding which is before you be allowed to participate as a party. As Mr. Nelson mentioned, the

24

Wasatch Energy Systems was issued an NOV by the Executive Secretary and exercised its right to appeal

25

that and bring it before you for a formal hearing on that, something which this Board has seen and

26

virtually all the environmental Boards have seen quite often. Where a non-party comes into the picture

27

then is where Mr. Griffin who has an interest, I'm sorry, Mr. Graham, has an interest in this matter has

PETITION TO INTERVENE BY MARK GRAHAM

1

filed a petition asking to intervene. And what that means is if he's allowed to intervene, he will become
party to the proceeding, he will be allowed to participate just as the other parties do, which means present
evidence, call witnesses, present documentary or other evidence, cross examine witnesses, make
arguments to the Board. And again, it's not that uncommon a proceeding, particularly in civil litigation.
The standard that you need to apply, though, is addressed in the Utah Administrative Code, I'm sorry, in
the Administrative Procedures Act, in Utah Code, section 63.46.B-9, which is entitled "Intervention."
And it basically says that when someone wishes to intervene in an administrative proceeding, they
should file a written application, which in this case Mr. Graham has done, and that the presiding officer
shall grant the petition to intervene if youfindthat the petitioner's, or in this case Mr. Graham's, legal
interests may be substantially affected by the proceeding and that neither the interest ofjustice nor the
prompt conduct of the proceedings will be materially impaired. I don't think the latter of that two-part
test is really much of an issue, but we'll address that in just a second. The real question then is whether
Mr. Graham has expressed, in his petition and in the affidavit which was attached, a legal interest which
is, or may be, substantially affected by these proceedings. It's there where we have very little guidance.
I can tell you that there is a little bit of case law on this that is not defined in the Administrative
Procedures Act. Best direction I can give you is a case law both in Utah and at the federal level on this
basically says that someone who intervenes must show that they have a legal interest which is specific to
himself, or to herself, as opposed to a general interest as a member of the public. Now in some extreme
cases that can be described as a specific injury or specific damage that has been done, but it doesn't
actually require a physical injury or damage, but still, a specific interest in the outcome of the hearing
which will impact that person beyond, in a specific personal way, as opposed to just a general interest as
a member of the public in seeing that the environmental laws are enforced. That's a difficult, I know and
sometimes not real clear description of the dilemma that you're in and I hope to answer any other
questions you may have when we get into the discussion, but I also in my role as Board counsel will

1

defer to the parties after I have given you a little bit more of this. Perhaps we can hear from them and

2

they can describe their view of this. In particular, Mr. Graham has expressed that in his petition and in

3

his affidavit and he can further address that today as far as how his legal interests have been affected or

4

may be affected. But that's what you have to decide and it's under the Administrative Procedures Act.

5

Case law again, it kind of draws the line between a specific inquiry or a specific interest, not necessarily

6

injury, of the plaintiff, or in this case the intervenor versus the vindication of just an undifferentiated

7

public interest in seeing the laws applied. Your options of course are either to grant or deny, but as far as

8

the consequences of that, let me try to give you just a little bit of a description of what I think the

9

consequences could be. In granting intervention, you would allow Mr. Graham to join, as a party, again

10

as I mentioned earlier, with all the rights to present evidence and examine, cross examine and the like.

11

That in itself is not a negative at all on the proceedings, other than it may lengthen the proceeding

12

slightly, but I don't think the Board would be very concerned with that. And just as an aside, I have

13

found in litigation experience that sometimes two heads are better than one. When you have more

14

parties sometimes they gather and address some things that I've forgotten, so that's not necessarily a bad

15

thing. But it's just something to keep in mind. And in the larger context where someone is allowed to

16

intervene, you also have the possible precedent setting, or precedential affect, of allowing a member of

17

the public to intervene in one of these matters. Again, that's not a legal bar; you can still go ahead and

18

do it, but just, I just hope you can make your decision knowing all the possible consequences. It's not a

19

legal, it would not be a legally binding precedent in the sense that, by allowing Mr. Graham in, you're

20

required to allow other interveners in the future, but just know you will hear the same arguments that

21

you've heardfromhim in the future for intervention in matters where you may not think intervention is

22

appropriate. So, just be aware of those possible consequences. There's also the possible consequence of

23

granting the intervention, I guess, as a possible objection by the respondents, and again, you can hear

24

from them directly, notfromme, but I know that Wasatch Energy Systems potentially could complain of

the intervention by way of seeking relief from the Court of Appeals. I don't know that they would do so,
but I just want to mention that's a possibility. The flip side of that is if you deny the intervention, we go
forward with the hearing with the parties who are already here, that is the Executive Secretary and the
staff and Wasatch Energy. Mr. Graham, if he chose to, could seek relief from the Court of Appeals, the
granting or denial of an intervention request is generally viewed as a final order which is appealable. So,
if he wished, he could apply to the Utah Court of Appeals and make his case there that, you know, he had
demonstrated a substantial legal interest and that because of that you should have allowed intervention.
If the Court of Appeals agreed with him, they would most likely remand the case back to you for a
hearing and have you hear it with Mr. Graham present. If, when that happens, you have not already
heard the case, really there's not a whole lot of harm done, perhaps a little bit of dely, but otherwise no
harm done. If you've already heard it, you would have to hear it again and just go through it again. But
again, those are just the procedural consequences. And on the issue of procedural, let me just mention
too that whatever your decision today, as Board counsel, I usually offer my assistance to the Board
chairman in drafting an order, since the Administrative Procedures Act requires a written order on your
decision, and I will do that, and I also urge you to express your opinions, your reasoning, and your, any
findings that you wish to express today on the decision because those can be incorporated into the order.
It's better for the process that people hear your reasoning and it's also frankly easier for me as your
lawyer if it ever goes to an appeal to have your reasoning expressed on the record. And that's just
something that we have had a little directivefromthe Court of Appeals over the course of many cases,
not just in the environmental Boards, that the better expressed your reasoning the easier it is to review.
That is usually included in the order, but also in the recorded discussion today. That's just sort of a quick
overview. Again, I would defer to the parties themselves to really make their case to you because I
wanted to just lay it out, I hope in neutral fashion, but I'm here to answer any questions as well.

1

Howard Van Boerum: Okay. Who may we hear from today? We could hear from the petitioner, we

2

could hear from Wasatch Energy, we could hear from the staff, we could hear from...

3

Mr. Rathbun: I would suggest that you hear from all three if they wish, in whatever order, probably

4

petitioner, since he is asking for the relief.

5

Mr. Van Boerum: Okay. Mr. Graham would you like to take a few minutes?

6

Mark Graham: Yes, please. Well, Mr. Chairman, members of the Board, I'm not gonna go over

7

everything that I stated in the petition to intervene. It's hopefully self explanatory. I am glad that we've

8

finally gotten to this point; it seems to have taken a while. I'm not an attorney, but I do have a little bit

9

of experience in this. You probably remember that I attempted a petition to intervene in a very similar

10

matter in 1998. We got to the issue of, as your counsel was just talking about, the question of does a

11

person, do I under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, do I qualify. He mentioned two tests; he

12

wasn't worried about the second one, but under the first test it's essentially a question of standing. And

13

we got to that point, but of course the Board never heard it; never ruled on it. I did some research into

14

that, both under case law at the state level, which is very limited, and there's case law at the federal level

15

which is, there's lots of it. This is not the federal case, per se, this is not Clean Air Act; however, we all

16

know that a lot of things that the Air Quality Board does are by way of implementing the Clean Air Act.

17

My reading, and I'm not an attorney, of the case law that I was able to find says that general

18

environmental degradation is sufficient injury for a person to have standing. So I would say that if

19

you're going to rule on this you should have the benefit of... Yes, please.

20

Richard Olson: Would you repeat that last statement again. I didn't get it.

21

Mark Graham: There was a Supreme Court case, Morton, which goes back twenty-some years and that

22

was really the first court case that attempted to define what would constitute standing for, in that case it

23

was not an individual, but it was a citizens group, and they were alleging environmental harm and from

24

reading that case, the Supreme Court said that general environmental degradation was sufficient injury

that a person could have standing, you know, if a person was seeking to intervene, or I guess to sue
maybe in that case, but in such a way as to prevent that injury. In other words, as I would look at this
situation, we have a municipal waste incinerator located in a densely populated residential area. There
are some 60,000 residents in Layton. I am not the nearest; I live approximately 2-1/2 miles away from
the smoke stacks, from the plant. There are, there is Mountain View Elementary school 1-1/2 miles
away. The nearest homes are approximately a quarter mile away. The thing about air pollution is that it
affects everybody. Air pollution knows no boundaries. If the test is, "Am I the only person affected by
the air pollution?," clearly I'm not and I don't think that's the test. It doesn't seem common sense to me.
So, I would encourage the Board, if you're going to rule on this issue which, without having it being said
by your counsel it's an issue of standing, I would encourage you to have the benefit of reading the case
law that I have found at the federal level, which I believe supports, would support my standing. The
other thing is that it's a public agency. I have made, well this is not my first effort, on a line of efforts
that I have made in order to be able to communicate my views on this particular source, Wasatch Energy
Systems, with the Board, I have found it difficult, and I believe that this is my last resort. I believe that
the Administrative Procedures Act was set up specifically to give a mechanism for citizens who are
interested in protecting the environment, such as myself, to have access to share my opinion with you
prior to your ruling on this NOV and whatever resolution there may be. I think that if the Board is to
deny this petition, it's the last, it's the avenue of last resort for the public to have input in the decision
making process at this level. We can all speak to our legislators and 20 years ago or whatever when they
passed the Air Conservation Act, that was the right time to do it. But at this level, at the administrative
level, I believe that a petition to intervene is the avenue of last resort. I don't really have anything
further to say on that. Further questions?
Joseph Thompson: Does this case, this Morton case from a couple decades ago at the Supreme Court
level, they're alleging environmental damage. I guess you had alleged that whatever violation they got

1

an NOV for caused some environmental damage?

2

Mr. Graham: Right.

3

Mr. Thompson: Okay. So they'd be equal in that regard. The Attorney General's guy says that you

4

would have to show injury specific to yourself beyond the general public, and I guess, you know, that's

5

what DAQ is there for is to protect the general public. If you have some standing beyond that of the

6

general public, that's what the Attorney General was, I think that's what he told us. You know, your

7

petition, you know, says you live close by, fruit which you grow in your yard, you're concerned about

8

important enforcement, you think that it impacts the Great Salt Lake and you like the birds there and

9

what not. Those all seem to me to be things that (inaudible) the general public and your injury, you

10

know, or your interest would have to be something, according to the Attorney General, specific to

11

yourself that would impact you beyond that, that would impact the general public. So, I wanted to see

12

what you think is different about you than the general public, for this injury.

13

Mr. Graham: Okay. General public, and they all breathe the same air. I've made substantially more

14

effort personally, individually, than the general public to, well to bring accountability, to the source and

15

to have their emissions minimized. In that sense, I'm different from the general public. My neighbors to

16

the left and my neighbors to the right arguably breathe virtually identically the same air. They don't take

17

their time to express their opinions to the Air Quality Board; they're not making an effort to get involved

18

in their government and improve the environment. I think your understanding of what your counsel said

19

is, that's the same thing that I heard and understood, and I just, I think that's too limiting. I think that

20

would exclude everybody.

21

Mr. Thompson: If that's the test though. If that were the test, just for a thought experiment, if that's the

22

test, the fact that you've been active in these matters wouldn't set you apart from the general public, it

23

would say that you regard the injury more acutely maybe than your neighbor that doesn't come here. But

24

I'm trying to, you know, if you appeal this, the Supreme Court, they're gonna be rubbin the same spot. I

1

don't want to overdwell on it, but specific to yourself beyond that that it affects the general public, aside

2

from coming here.

3

Mr. Graham: Certainly, and I don't want to say anything that seems like I'm waiving my rights, but if

4

that were the test, then certainly, I'm basically, in terms of the air I breathe and how it affects my body,

5 J

I'm not, you know, I don't have lung cancer or respiratory problems that would necessarily make me

6 I

more susceptible.

7

Mr. Thompson: I don't know that you have to say it's injury or damage; it's your legal rights.

8

Mr. Graham: That's what I was going to say.

9

Mr. Thompson: It's not different than the general public.

10

Mr. Graham: Well, no. If you read the Administrative Procedures Act, 46.B-9, as your counselor

11

referred to, what that says is the petitioner demonstrates legal rights that would be substantially affected

12 I

by the proceeding. The test is not in there. The Administrative Procedures Act does not have this test

13

that says I have to demonstrate, that I have to be different from Joe and Jane Public. The Administrative

14

Procedures Act says that I demonstrated substantial, or legal rights and interests that could be

15 I

substantially affected by the proceeding, and I think I have.

16

Mr. Olson: Mr. Graham, I'm a little bothered about, I've just been thinking in my mind, anybody can

17 J

appear before anybody and make any charge, we all know that. I guess it comes down to the facts of the

18

matter and documentation and such. Now, it seems that, it seems in order to, in order to claim injury of

19

some, in some way, there has to be documentation of injury, and, so I ask you, is there documentation.

10

What is the injury and such to the environment, or whatever you claim?

!1

Mr. Graham: It would be the, the documentation that I would rely on to answer your question is the

2

exact same documentation that this Board relied on when it issued the Notice of Violation and Order for

3

Compliance in July 9 of 1999, and that is exceedance of the source's emission limits for dioxins on both

4 I

of the stacks. I would rely on that exact same documentation.
8

1

Mr. Van Boerum: Do Board members have any questions of Mr. Graham, further explanations on his

2

position? If not, thank you.

3

Mr. Graham: Thank you Mr. Chairman. If counsel for Wasatch Energy Systems says something that I

4

feel a need to reply to, will I be given the opportunity?

5

Mr. Van Boerum: Sure.

6

Mr. Graham: Thank you very much.

7

Mr. Van Boerum: Does Wasatch Energy Systems wish to make a statement.

8

Richard Armstrong: Yes, just briefly, if I might. My name is Richard Armstrong and I do represent

9

Wasatch Energy Systems today, and I'm filling in for Mr. Jenkins.

10

Mr. Thompson: Could I say at this point, Wood Crapo is the law firm, right?

11

Mr. Armstrong: That's correct.

12

Mr. Thompson: They represent Thiokol, and in fact, they are representing us on another matter. Sol

13

just want that known.

14

Mr. Armstrong: My comments are going to be very brief because, let me just preface my comments by

15

stating that we really do not specifically oppose the petition that was filed in this case by Mr. Graham.

16

But, I would like to reiterate what you pointed on, Mr. Thompson, and that is that Mr. Graham needs to

17

show an injury specific to himself beyond simply an injury to the general public, and in his petition on

18

page 2, at the top of the page, he indicates that he has a legal right and interest as do other residents. And

19

then he states in the sentence after that that it is a matter of air quality and public health. I don't know if

20

you can, if you see where I was reading there, at the top of page 2 of his petition. But I think those

21

interests that he points to are really interests that belong to the public. In the Attorney General's Office,

22

I'll let the Attorney General speak for the Attorney General's Office, but I think the representation there

23

is adequate to represent the interests of Mr. Graham that's he's expressed in his petition and having said

24

that, I'll turn the time over to Mr. Nelson, unless you have some questions for me.

Mr. Van Boerum: Anyone have any questions for Mr. Armstrong? Fred.
Fred Nelson: I just have a couple of comments on behalf of the staff. The staff has not filed an
objection to the petition to intervene. We believe that the staff will adequately represent the interests
presented by the Notice of Violation and on behalf of the public. There are a number of issues raised by
Mr. Graham that we do not believe, as a staff, are relevant to the proceeding and we would, if he's
granted the opportunity to intervene, we would make the appropriate objections to those issues at the
time of the hearing. But at this point, we haven't filed an objection; it's just a matter the Board needs to
consider if Mr. Graham is allowed to participate. We don't support that, but we don't oppose it either.
It's a neutral position.
Mr. Van Boerum: Okay. I'd like to hear another comment from Mr. Rathbun about the case law that
was cited by Mr. Graham and your response to that.
Mr. Rathbun: Thank you Mr. Chairman. The case law is voluminous at the federal level, as
Mr. Graham mentioned. There's a lot of cases and it's been changing over the last, well I've practiced
law 20 years now, it's been changing over the last 20 years. I don't think it's accurate to say that general
environmental degradation is the test of a substantial legal interest. Quite clearly, under the various
cases that have come down just in the last five years or so at the Supreme Court level, standing to
challenge, or standing to enforce environmental laws, has been considerably narrowed. I didn't use the
term "standing" because I didn't want to confuse the Board because it's often used in a confusing way.
Let me just say that in this context, "standing" refers to the status of a person, or the position of a person,
to actually come before you, and it's often been melded into the concept of whether that person has an
injury which is, can be remedied in a court of law. So, if you have no injury and need no remedy, you
really don't have a cause of action. That's a little different from the question of standing. The best
example I can give you on standing is foreign corporations historically, in most states, if a corporation
runs their trucks through the state of Utah, but has not registered to do business in the state of Utah, it's
10

1

an out-of-state corporation, it doesn't have offices here, but happens to run through the state in their

2

truck, and has an accident and decides it wants to sue somebody, the courts have not allowed that

3

because they've said you do not have legal standing to sue in the state because you have not followed

4

(inaudible) to become an authorized corporation in the state of Utah. You may have an injury. You

5

very well may have an injury because of that accident, but legally we do not recognize your right to step

6

into the shoes of a litigate in our courts until you comply with the law and register with the registered

7

agent and all those things. That's the simplest example of standing I can give you. As I said, it's often

8

being confused with the concept of legal rights or remedies that may come along and courts, just like the

9

rest of us, sometimes get confused and blend those two concepts together and so someone doesn't have

10

injury, they say they don't have standing. That's the court's analysis, but that doesn't necessarily answer

11

the question. But still, in that context at the federal level, the ability of a person to assert standing to

12

appear in federal court and either claim the sort of a private attorney general right to enforce the law in a

13

citizen suit context under the federal statutes or to actually seek injunctive relief for some kind of

14

damages or other type of damages or an injury has been narrowed considerably and I can say I think with

15

a great deal of confidence that the general test is, the test is not general environmental degradation, it is

16

narrowed to a specific requirement that the party who wishes to intervene must show they've had a

17

substantial legal interest that's been impacted, or may be impacted. It doesn't have to be an actual

18

physical injury or monetary damages, it can be a legal right or legal interest, but it has to be specific to

19

that person beyond those rights and interests which the man on the street has. We all have an interest in

20

environmental enforcement. We all may have different views of it, but I think we all have a legal

21

interest in seeing that environmental enforcement is brought about in an effective way. And if that is the

22

test, than any person living in the state of Utah or at least in Davis County somewhere near this site could

23

come in and ask to intervene and you will be asked then to possibly, I'm not sure that many people

24

would be interested, but potentially, people, on that test, could be allowed to intervene because they want
11

1

to see the environmental laws enforced. The statutory scheme as it's set up as I see it with DEQ and the

2

Executive Secretary and with some public participation built into the system doesn't contemplate, in my

3

view, that sort of intervention en masse by people without a specific injury. Mr. Graham is right that

4

under the Administrative Procedures Act all we have is the bare language of the Act; we don't have

5

really a definition of substantial legal interest or right, but I can tell you too we have a little helpfromthe

6

Court of Appeals. Back in about 1992 or so, the Sierra Club was challenging the, some of the permit, the

7

granting of the permit and some of the permit terms for the Clive incineration facility out in Tooele

8

County. This was before the Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste Control Board, and they were allowed to

9

intervene on a very limited basis by stipulation of the parties. But when it got to the Court of Appeals,

10

because they basically lost their challenge to the permit and the permit was issued, when they appealed to

11

the Court of Appeals, they basically challenged that and the Court of Appeals addressed the standing

12

issue and with language that was fairly strong actually, said that mere allegations, or at least allegations

13

by members of the Sierra Club that their use and enjoyment of the western Utah, western Utah generally,

14

and that their use would be adversely impacted by the Clive incineration facility failed to show any

15

specific injury such as to grant standing or to allow intervention. They had been allowed to intervene by

16

stipulation, but on the other issue beyond that, and that allowed them actually to intervene for very

17

limited issues, not even for the entire matter. That's why the issue came up on appeal. So, it's not a

18

binding decision necessarily, but I think you can get a sense of the way the Utah Court of Appeals has

19

viewed it so far, that that language indicates they are very specifically following the trend in the federal

20

law requiring a specific injury or interest, not a general interest common to the man on the street. I think

21

that's the law and I think you need to obviously take that under serious consideration. I think on the

22

merits of this, these things are never easy and if you allow Mr. Graham to participate, so be it. But keep

23

in mind, however you're inclined to rule, the law indicates a requirement of a specific interest, not a

24

general interest, and that's what you need to decide today-has he demonstrated that?.
12

1

Mr. Thompson: Would granting, if we said we think that Mark's arguments are compelling and that

2

because he's interested in this we think he ought to have standing, is that somehow precedent setting?

3

You said that we'd start hearing that back again. I don't want 90,000 people trooping through...

4

Mr. Rathbun: It is, but let me not overstate that. It's not precedent setting in the sense of a legally

5

binding decision.

6

Mr. Thompson: But it would be an example.

7

Mr. Rathbun: Right. So the next time if in another hearing someone wanted to intervene they couldn't

8

say "You're bound by that decision." It would be a whole new case. You'd be entitled to make your

9

decision again on the merits, but they would certainly use that decision as an example of why you should

10

follow a similar decision.

11

Mr. Thompson: What about the appeals court? Would the appeals court find some weight in granting

12

Mark's standing here, I mean like later, another new case, unrelated.

13

Mr. Rathbun: They might. I guess what you're asking is in another case if we allowed, or disallowed,

14

some request to intervene and then they appeal to the Court of Appeals and argue well, they've allowed it

15

before. Maybe. I think the Court of Appeals would still want to, clearly they are entitled to make a

16

decision on the facts in the law, independent of the Board on a decision like that because it is a legal

17

decision. Again, this is beyond the scope of really what we want to talk about today. I have practiced

18

law 20 years and I still don't always understand...factual decisions versus legal, but clearly on that it's a

19

legal decision the Court of Appeals would decide. I don't think they would really care that much, but

20

certainly the argument would be made that the Board allowed it, why not again. It would not be binding

21

on the Court of Appeals; they hear it.

22

Mr. Thompson: It's not binding on the Board either.

23

Mr. Rathbun: Right. It's not.

24

Mr. Van Boerum: Probably our discussions ought to focus on the facts that are available, the law that's
13

1

available, the arguments that have been given and not on any supposition of what might or might not

2

happen in later situations. Does the Board wish to hear from any other parties involved in this? I think

3

we've given each party ample opportunity to express their position.

4

Mr. Thompson: Mark might want to rebut that or talk again.

5

Mr. Graham: There are a couple of things. I read that court case, 1992 Utah Court of Appeals, and it

6

was fresh in my mind right about the time of July of 1998 when Wasatch Energy Systems had submitted

7

a legal filing to this Board that claimed I did not have standing. It's not nearly as fresh in my mind at

8

this point, and I really think that there are some differences between that case and this. One of the things

9

that that court said was that you cannot stipulate standing, which apparently had been done. The court

10

said that I just don't buy that you can stipulate standing in the first place. It was a little different in, as a

11

blur, there are many processes and many steps in many processes that you take and you can make a

12

decision and then somebody can appeal your decision and at this point you're not, the only thing the

13

Board has done with this source is issued a Notice of Violation and Order for Compliance. It's a little bit

14

different, you're at a little bit different step in a process, and I believe you're in a little bit different

15

process than was contemplated in that case. I would really appreciate and request the right to be able to

16

review that case and tell you what I think it says and what I think it does not say before you're going to

17

make this decision. If I'd known that I should be prepared and fluent in that case today, believe me I

18

would have been. I didn't. As long as we're talking about federal law, the Clean Air Act section 7604 is

19

the provision for citizen suits, and it spells out the rights of a citizen to do two things: one is to sue either

20

a source or the Environmental Protection Agency and another one is to intervene. I'm going to focus on

21

the provision of the Clean Air Act that talks about intervention, and I remember this verbatim because

22

the language is so absolutely clear. First, it says, it defines the circumstances and the steps that a person

23

has to take in order to sue under the Clean Air Act section 7604, and then it says in any such case, and I

24

quote, "Any person may intervene as a matter of right," end quote. That's the federal law. I think that's
14

1

crystal clear. If we're talking about federal law, I think that's perfect guidance. Regarding the fact that

2

Mr. Nelson mentioned that are some issues that I have raised in my petition that he and the staff feel are

3

not totally relevant, the Board could, of course, grant the petition to intervene, but exclude certain items.

4

You can say, okay Mark, we're just not going to talk about the following, a, b, c and d. And that

5

problem would be taken care of. Another thing I remember from case law is the concept of creating a

6

private attorney general. This is a term that's come down in federal case law. The citizen suit provision

7

was put into the United States Clean Air Act because Congress saw the need for creating a mechanism

8

for people to get involved, and this is what they called private attorneys general. Basically it would be

9

because there could be circumstances where either the regulatory agency is stretched too thin to devote

10

sufficient resources to a source, or in some rare cases, there's conflict of interest and the agency simply

11

is more sympathetic to the source than to the public. But it could be for either one of those reasons that

12

Congress created the citizen suit provision and to encode into law, to codify, the private attorneys general

13

concept and I think that the Attorney General, the one we have in Utah, doesn't need a personal injury, so

14

would a private attorney general need to have, to demonstrate personal injury? I don't think so.

15

Speaking of injury and back to that Utah Court of Appeals case from 1992, members of the Sierra Club

16

in that case alleged future, their use and enjoyment of the west desert would be jeopardized if a

17

hazardous waste incinerator facility was going to be permitted. It think it's a little, when dioxins go into

18

the air and that's the reason this Board sent the Notice of Violation out, it's a specific thing, it's

19

emissions of dioxins into the air and dioxins, they're bad for you. You can ask your toxicologist and

20

your scientists how bad dioxins are for you, but I think it's a more of a real thing than the fact that I can't

21

enjoy the west desert as much. Anyway, and the last point I want to make is if you're afraid that you will

22

have dozens, or hundreds, or possibly thousands of citizens of the state of Utah attempting to intervene in

23

every matter that comes your way, I would want to reassure you that I don't think that's going to happen.

24

Right now you're looking at one person, and that's me. I think the citizens of this state do care about
15

1

clean air, but I don't think you're gonna have just a parade of all kinds of people into that door to this

2

room petitioning to intervene. I simply don't believe that that would happen. And I thank you for your

3

time. Does anybody else have another question?

4

Mr. Van Boerum: Does the Board have questions? Mr. Rathbun, do you have any final comments?

5

Mr. Rathbun: No, I don't believe so. I'd be glad to answer any other questions.

6

Mr. Van Boerum: Okay. I think the Board has been sufficiently briefed and has heard both sides of the

7

argument, has been briefed by our attorney. Guess you've taken notes as I have on what he has said

8

relative to the law, so I'd entertain a motion by a member of the Board to either grant or deny the petition

9

to intervene.

10

Mr. Thompson: I'd make a motion to not grant petition to intervene based on the requirement for him

11

to show an injury or damage specific to himself beyond that which would occur to the general public.

12

Mr. Olson: I'd second that motion with this statement that as well intended as Mr. Graham's petition to

13

intervene may be, I only have legal counsel to direct my thoughts for the most part, but it seems to me

14

like it does fall short in meeting his obligation to show cause of impact or injury. So, I'll second the

15

motion.

16

Mr. Van Boerum: We have a motion and a second. Do we have any comments from the Board on the

17

motion. Call for the question?

18

Board Member: I'll call the question.

19

Mr. Van Boerum: Okay. All in favor?

20

Board Members: Aye

21

Mr. Van Boerum: Opposed?

22

Dannie McConkie: I'd like to abstain.

23

Mr. Van Boerum: That's been abstained. Okay. The petition to intervene has been denied by

24

unanimous vote of the Board. Thank you all.
16

Mr. Nelson: Mr. Chairman, may I raise an issue?
Mr. Van Boerum: Yes.
Mr. Nelson: And that is because there are seven members of the Board and we have one abstaining, I
think the Chairman needs to vote because you have to have six votes.
Mr. Van Boerum: All in favor?
Board Members: Aye
Mr. Van Boerum: Opposed? Okay, it still passes. Thank you.

1

I, Hannie M. Moeller, do hereby certify:

2

That the foregoing proceedings were transcribed into typewritten copy from an audio tape

3
4
5
6

recording of the December 1, 1999, meeting of the Utah Air Quality Board.
That the foregoing pages contain a true and correct transcription of the audio recording to the
best of my knowledge and ability.
In Witness Whereof, I have subscribed my name this 21 st day of January, 2000.
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The Clinton administration is preparing to dramatically raise its estimate
of health threats from dioxin, citing new evidence of cancer risk from
exposure to the toxic chemical compound.
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A draft of a long-awaited report by the Environmental Protection Agency
concludes for the first time that dioxin is a "human carcinogen." The
report notes that emissions of dioxin have plummeted from their peak
levels in the 1970s but still may pose a significant cancer threat to some
people who ingest the chemical through foods in a normal diet.
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Dioxin comes from both natural and industrial sources, such as medical
and municipal waste incineration and paper-pulp production. The
chemical enters the food chain when animals eat contaminated plants.
Dioxin then accumulates in the fat of mammals and fish. It has been
linked to several cancers in humans, including lymphomas and lung
cancer.
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For a small segment of the population who eat large amounts of fatty
foods, such as meats and dairy products that are relatively high in
dioxins, the odds of developing cancer could be as high as 1 in 100, the
report says. That estimate places the risk 10 times as high as the EPAs
previous projections.
Exposure to dioxin occurs over a lifetime, and the danger is cumulative,
the report said. Studies have found that people all over the globe have
some dioxin in their bodies.
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The report, obtained by The Washington Post, links low-grade exposure
to dioxin to a wide array of other health problems, including changes in
hormone levels as well as developmental defects in babies and children.
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It also concludes that children's dioxin intake is proportionally much
higher than adults' because of the presence of the chemical in dairy
products and even breast milk.
"It's the Darth Vader of toxic chemicals because it affects so many
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systems [of the body]," said Richard Clapp, a cancer epidemiologist at
Boston University's School of Public Health. "The amounts, are coming
down, but even small amounts are harmful."

Pase 2 ot'4

The EPA's draft assessment, iffinalizedin its current form, would solidify
dioxin's status as one of the most potent chemical toxins known to
science.
Although the risk from dioxin varies widely—and may be nearly zero for
many people-the findings suggest that dioxin already contributes to a
significant number of cancer deaths each year. Environmentalists,
extrapolating from the EPA's risk findings, have estimated that about 100
of the roughly 1,400 cancer deaths occurring daily in the United States
are attributable to dioxin.
Officials predicted yesterday that the report would stimulate many
questions about the safety of the food supply. Administration officials
said, however, that the higher dioxin risks should not discourage people
from eating nutritious foods and following dietary guidelines emphasizing
low-fat foods. The report stressed that mothers should continue to
breast-feed because the benefits far outweigh the risk of dioxin exposure.
In an indication of the potentially far-reaching implications of the report,
the White House has intervened in an unusual way to coordinate its
release. The report is scheduled to be released in June and will be
evaluated by scientific reviewers.
It's not clear that thefindingswill lead to new regulations on dioxin
emissions, but EPA briefing papers discussed several strategies for
reducing human exposure to the chemical, including better monitoring.
The findings came as a surprise even to EPA policymakers who have
tracked slowly falling levels of dioxin in the environment—the result of a
series of tough new regulations on dioxin-emitting industries.
The EPA said industrial emissions of dioxins have been reduced some 80
percent between 1987 and 1995.
"We're heading in the right direction because we're seeing dioxin levels
decrease," said one administration official who spoke on the condition of
anonymity. But while dioxin levels in the population are declining, "our
ability to understand the risk has improved," the official said.
Dioxin came to public attention as the contaminant in Agent Orange, a
controversial herbicide used by U.S. forces in Vietnam. In 1983, the EPA
forced the evacuation and demolition of the entire town of Times Beach,
Mo., after the discovery of dioxin contamination on city streets.
Industry scientists have long accused the EPA of overstating the threat
from dioxin, and many believed the agency's review would result in a
http ://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/Al 3 908-2000May 16.html
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downgrading of the official risk estimate.
C.T. Kip Howlett, vice president and executive director of the Chlorine
Chemistry Council, said the EPA has a conservative view of the health
risks of dioxin and they are "out of sync" with the rest of the world's view
on safe levels of the chemical.
Howlett said the agency "has a real problem on it's hands" in expressing
apocalyptic concern about dioxin, while also stressing that the food
supply is safe, breast feeding is the right thing to do and regulatory
initiatives are working.
"There are a lot of things in this report that are counterintuitive to what
the facts are," Howlett said.
Keith Holman, chief regulator/ counsel of the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, said no industry wants to produce dioxin—which is an
unintended by-product of combustion—"but let's make sure we have
sound science before we regulate down to a zero level where it's clearly
not warranted."
Environmentalists supported'the EPA'sfindingsbut raised concerns that
the agency would use falling dioxin levels as an excuse to delay any
further tightening of regulations to control dioxins.
"They seem to be taking a triage approach, not worrying about emissions
but dietary exposures of human beings," said Rick Hind of Greenpeace
International's toxics program. "That suggests they can't walk and chew
gun at the same time."
The agency's understanding of dioxin has improved since the agency
began in-depth studies in 1991, and this installment is particularly
important because it includes results of landmark human epidemiological
studies from Europe and the United States.
In a briefing to EPA managers on May 10, the agency said it expected
"many stakeholders to take dramatic action when the draft reassessment
is released," and pressure from other interests given the "extraordinary"
findings of the reassessment.
For the first time, the agency's draft report classifies the most potent form
of dioxin-2,3,7,8-tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin (TCDD)--as a "human
carcinogen," a step above the previous ranking of "probable carcinogen."
More than 100 other dioxin-like compounds were classified as "likely"
human carcinogens.
Over the past five years, the EPA has imposed regulations on major
dioxin emitters, including municipal waste combustors, medical waste
incinerators, hazardous waste incinerators, cement kilns that burn

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A13908-2000Mayl6.html
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hazardous waste, pulp and paper operations, and sources of PCBs.
When those regulations become fully effective over the next few years,
the agency expects further declines of dioxin levels.
"We still have a certain amount of dioxin circulating in the environment.
We need to focus on the idea of reducing exposure and not simply going
after all sources to the environment," said one administration official.
One source likely to be targeted is uncontrolled residential waste burning,
such as burning trash in back yards, particularly in rural areas, EPA
briefing papers said. Such burning is "one of the largest unaddressed
dioxin sources and one that could have a disproportionally large
contribution to the food supply."
The agency also is discussing the possible regulation of other sources
such as sludge disposal from privately owned waste-treatment facilities
and the regulation of other air sources of pollution.
Sources said that there have been lengthy discussions at the EPA on how
to release the report and answer questions stemming from it.
Several federal agencies have been involved in the preparation of the
report and are expected to participate in the review of it. Agencies such
as the Agriculture Department and the Food and Drug Administration, as
well as the Food Safety Council, are readying their own responses to
questions about the safety of the food supply, advice on following the
dietary guidelines and breast feeding.
"People were not expecting this was an issue they had to deal with," an
administration official said. "Over the last eight years there have been
regulations that have already cut dioxin emissions from the most likely
sources."
© 2000 The Washington Post Company
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Certified Mail

DAQC-846-97

June 25, 1997

LeGrand Bitter
Davis County Energy Recovery Facility
650 East Highway 193
Layton, Utah 84041-8647
Dear Mr. Bitter:
Re:

DAVIS COUNTY ENERGY RECOVERY FACILITY - NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND ORDER FOR
COMPLIANCE - Conditions 7 and 8 of Approval Order (AO) DAQE-850-96 Dated September 10, 1996Davis County

On June 9,1997, an inspector representing the Executive Secretary of the Utah Air Quality Board performed a review
of the results of stack testing performed on the Davis County Energy Recovery Facility Incinerator in February and April,
1997 located at 650 East Highway 193, Davis County. As a result of the stack test review, it was determined that Davis
County Energy Recovery Facility was in violation of Conditions 7 and 8 of the AO dated September 10, 1996.
The enclosed NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND ORDER FOR COMPLIANCE is based on the findings documented
by the inspector. Please be advised that compliance with this ORDER is mandatory and will not relieve the company
of liability for any past violations.
Written notification of Davis County Energy Recovery Facility's intent to comply, outlining how compliance is to be
achieved, must be submitted to the Division of Air Quality within 15 days of the receipt of this notice. A meeting will
then be arranged to discuss the violation, findings, and resolution. Questions regarding this matter may be directed to
Anthony DeArcos at (801) 536-4028.
Sincerely,

Ursula K. Trueman, Executive Secretary
Utah Air Quality Board
UKT:AD:tj
Enclosure:
cc:

NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND ORDER FOR COMPLIANCE

Department of Environmental Quality, Dianne R. Nielson
EPA Region VIII. Lee Hanley
Davis County Health Department

THE UTAH AIR QUALITY

BOARD

ooOoo

In

the Matter

Davis

County

Recovery

of
Energy

Facility

:

NOTICE OF VIOLATION

:

AND ORDER FOR

:

COMPLIANCE

:
ooOoo

No.

97060024

This NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND ORDER FOR COMPLIANCE is issued by the UTAH AIR QUALITY
BOARD (the Board) pursuant to the Utah Air Conservation Act (Act) Section 19-2-101,
et sea. , Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended.
The Executive Secretary is
authorized to issue Notices of Violation pursuant to Section 19-2-110 of Utah Code
Annotated. The Board has delegated to the Executive Secretary authority to issue
ORDERS in accordance with Section 19-2-107(2) (g) of the Utah Code Annotated.

FINDINGS
1.

Davis County Energy Facility operates a waste incinerator at 650 East Highway
193, in Davis County, Utah.

2.

On September 10, 1996, the Executive Secretary issued an Approval Order (AO)
to Davis County Energy Recovery Facility in accordance with Utah
Administrative Code (UAC) R307-1-3.1.
A.

Condition 7 of the AO states, in part:
"Emissions to the atmosphere from each discharge point of the bi-flue
stack shall not exceed the following rates and concentrations..."
HC1 (Hydrogen Chloride): 330 ppmdv @ 7% 02.

B.'

Condition 8 of the AO states, in part:
* Initial compliance testing shall be done for all contaminants
specified in this approval order for both incinerators during
January/February 1997.. . The Executive Secretary is fully aware that
performing the requisite tests may prove impossible during very cold
weather due to procedural difficulties and will allow rescheduling
testing to more clement weather should the ambient temperature be below
20 degrees F at the start of the scheduled test..."

On February 5-8, 1997, and April 17, 1997, Air Pollution Testing, Inc.
conducted stack tests at Davis County Energy Recovery Facility's Incinerator
Stacks A and B. Stack test results were to be submitted to the Division of
Air Quality (DAQ) 3 0 days after the stack tests were performed. Stack test
results for both test dates were submitted on May 30, 1997.
On June 9, 1997, a representative of the Executive Secretary (inspector)
performed a review of the Davis County Energy Recovery Facility's stack test
report results submitted to the DAQ by Air Pollution Testing, Inc. As part
of the review, the inspector found that results were 339.3 ppmdv @ 7% 02 for
Hcl (Hydrogen Chloride) on Stack A for the February 5-8, 1997, stack test and
350 ppmdv @ 7% 02 for HC1 ( Hydrogen Chloride), on Stack A for the April 17,
1997, stack test.
On June 9, 1997, the inspector also found in reviewing the stack test report
thai the Davis County Energy Recovery Facility did not complete testing for
Dioxins/Furans during the February 5-3, 1997, stack tests. Data from -the
National Weather Service shows that the ambient temperature was.not below
20 degrees F. during the time of testing as Davis County Energy Recovery
Facility claims in the stack test report.

VIOLATIONS
1.'

Based on the foregoing FINDINGS, Davis County Energy Recovery Facility is in
violation of UAC R307-1-3.1 and the AO dated September 10, 1996, Condition
7, for exceeding the emissions limit for Stack A.

2.

Based of the foregoing FINDINGS, Davis County Energy Recovery Facility is in
violation of UAC R307-1-3.1 and the AO dated September 10, 1996, Condition
8,. for failing to perform a stack test for Dioxins/Furans in January/February
1997.
ORDER

Based on the foregoing FINDINGS AND VIOLATIONS, Davis County Energy Recovery
Facility, pursuant to Section 19-2-107(2) (g) of the Utah Code Annotated, is hereby
ORDERED TO:
1.

Immediately initiate all actions necessary to achieve total compliance
with ail applicable provisions of the Act.

2.

Notify this office in writing on or before the 15th day of receipt of
this letter, of Davis County Energy Recovery Facility's intent to
comply with this ORDER and indicate how compliance is to be achieved.

COMPLIANCE, QPP9RTVNTTY FQR A HgARtNC
This ORDER is effective immediately and shall become final unless Davis County
Energy Recovery Facility within thirty (30) days pursuant to Utah Code Annotated
19-2-110. Section 19-2-115 of the*Utah Code Annotated provides that violators of
the Utah Air Conservation Act and/or any ORDER issued thereunder may be subject to
a civil penalty of up to $10,000.00 per day for each violation.

Dated

^,T/CJ?

day of

VU/np^

Ursula K. Trueman, Executive Secretary
Utah Air Quality Board

, 1997.

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
DIVISION OF AIR QUALITY
Michael O. Leavitt
Governor

Dianne R. Nielson. Ph.D.
Executive Director

Ursula K. Trueman. P.E.
Director
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150 North 1950 West
P.O. Box 144820
Salt Lake City. Utah 84114-4820
(801)536-4000 Voice
(801) 536-4099 Fax
(801) 536-4414 T.D.D.

DAQC-330-99
July 9, 1999

JUL 2 3 * "
Mr. LeGrand Bitter
Wasatch Energy Systems
650 East Highway 193
Layton, Utah 84041-8647
Dear Mr. Bitter:
RE:

NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND ORDER TO COMPLY - Utah Administrative Code (UAC)
R307-401 and Conditions 7 and 8 of Approval Order (AO) dated September 10, 1996 - Wasatch
Energy Systems - Davis County

On January 15, 1999, the Division of Air Quality received a report dated January 12, 1999, of compliance
testing performed at the Unit A Discharge Point and the Unit B Discharge Point of the Bi-Flue Stack on
September 15, 1998, through September 17, 1998. The report data indicate that at the time of testing,
dioxin/furan emissions from the Unit A Discharge Point of the Bi-Flue Stack averaged 624 nanograms per dry
standard cubic meter corrected to seven percent oxygen (ng/dscm @7% 02), and that dioxin/furan emissions
from the Unit B Discharge Point of the Bi-Flue Stack averaged 685 ng/dscm @ 1% 0 2 . These are violations
of Condition 7 of the AO dated September 10, 1996, which limits dioxin/furan emissions from each point of
the Bi-Flue Stack to 360 ng/dscm @ 1% O,.
In February, 1999, the Division of Air Quality received a report dated February 3, 1999, of compliance testing
performed at the Unit A Discharge Point and the Unit B Discharge Point of the Bi-Flue Stack commencing
on December%199& DAQ was not notified of the testing as required by Condition 8 of the AO and the tests
were not conducted for Dioxin/Furan using an arithmetic average of three 4-hour minimum stack test runs as
required by Condition 7 of the AO. Therefore, the December testing does not constitute a compliance
demonstration as required by Condition 8 of the AO.
The enclosed NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND ORDER TO COMPLY is based on the data contained in
the stack test report. The ORDER is effective immediately. Compliance with the ORDER is mandatory and
will not relieve the company of liability for any past violations. To request a formal administrative hearing,
the procedures detailed in the paragraph entitled "Compliance, Opportunity for a Hearing" must be followed.
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The ORDER requires Wasatch Energy Systems to submit written notification of its intent to comply, including
the date(s) when stack testing will again be performed to demonstrate that compliance with the dioxin/furan
emission lim:.t has been achieved at both the Unit A and Unit B Discharge Points, to the Division of Air
Quality within 15 calendar days of receiving the ORDER. A meeting will then be arranged to discuss the
violations, findings, and resolution. Questions regarding this matter may be directed to Harold Burge at
(801)536-4129.
WHEN RESPONDING, DO NOT REFER TO DAQC#, REFER TO THE DATE ON THIS LETTER.
Sincerely,

Ursula K. Trueman, Executive Secretary
Utah Air Quality Board
UKT:HAB:vmn
Enclosure:

NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND ORDER FOR COMPLIANCE

cc:

Dianne R. Nielson. Executive Director Department of Environmental Quality
Carol Smith, EPA Region VIII
Davis County Health Department

THE UTAH AIR QUALITY BOARD
00O00

In the Matter of
Wasatch Energy Systems
(WES)

NOTICE OF VIOLATION
AND ORDER FOR
COMPLIANCE
No.99030004
00O00

This NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND ORDER ?<SR COMPLIANCE is issued by the UTAH AIR QUALITY
BOARD (the Board) pursuant to the Utah Air Conservation Act (Act) Section 19-2-101,
et sea., Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended.
The Executive Secretary is
authorized to issue Notices of Violation pursuant to Section 19-2-110 of Utah Code
Annotated. The Board has delegated to the Executive Secretary authority to issue
ORDERS in accordance with Section 19-2-107(2) (g) of the Utah Code Annotated.
FINDINGS
1.

WES operates two municipal waste combustor units (Units A and B) located at
650 East Highway 193, Layton, Davis County, Utah.

WES7 offices are located

at that same address.
2.

On September 10, 1996, the Executive Secretary issued an Approval Order (AO)
to WES in accordance with Utah Administrative Code (UAC) R307-401. Condition
7 of that AO limits dioxin/furan emissions from each discharge point of the
3i-Flue Stack to 3 60 nanograms per dry standard cubic meter corrected to seven
percent oxygen (ng/dscm £ 7% 0:) . Condition 8 of the AO requires annual stack
tests for a compliance demonstration.

3.

On January 15, 1999, the Executive Secretary received a report dated January
12, 1999, of compliance testing performed at the Unit A Discharge Point of the
3i-Flue Stack and the Unit B Discharge Point of the Bi-Flue Stack on September
15, 1998, through September 17, 1998. The report data indicate the following:

4.

A.

At the time of testing, dioxin/furan emissions from the Unit A Discharge
Point of the Bi-Flue Stack averaged 624 ng/dscm @ 7% 0..

3.

At the time of testing, dioxin/furan emissions from the Unit B Discharge
Point of the Bi-Flue Stack averaged 685 ng/dscm § 7% 0-.

In February, 1999, the Division of Air Quality received a report dated
February 3, 1999, of compliance testing performed at the Unit A Discharge
Point and the Unit B Discharge Point of the Bi-Flue Stack commencing on
December 1, 1998.
DAQ was not notified
of the testing as required by
Condition 8 of the AO and the tests were not conducted for Dioxin/Furan using
an arithmetic average of three 4-hour minimum stack test runs as required by
Condition 7 of the AO.

VIOLATIONS

Based on the foregoing FINDINGS, WES is in violation of the following:
A.

Condition 7 of the AO dated September 10, 1996, for exceedance of the
dioxin/furan emission limit at the Unit A Discharge Point of the Bi-Flue
Stack.

3.

Condition 7 of the AO dated September 10, 1996, for exceedance of the
dioxin/furan emission limit at the Unit B Discharge Point of the Bi-Flue
Stack.

C.

Condition 8 of the AO for failing to conduct testing which constitutes
an annual compliance demonstration.
ORDER

Based on the foregoing FINDINGS AND VIOLATIONS, WES, pursuant to Section 19-2107(2) (g) of the Utah Code Annotated, is hereby ORDERED TO:
1,

Immediately initiate all actions necessary to achieve total compliance
with all applicable provisions of the Act.

2.

Notify this office in writing on or before the 15th day of receipt of
this letter, of WES' intent to comply with this ORDER and indicate the
date(s) on which WES will again perform stack testing at both the Unit
A and Unit B Discharge Points of the Bi-Flue Stack to demonstrate that
compliance with the dioxin/furan emission limit found in Condition 7 of
the AO dated September 10, 1996, has been achieved.
COMPLIANCE. OPPORTUNITY FOR A HEARING

This ORDER is effective immediately and shall become final unless Wasatch Energy
Systems requests, in writing, a hearing within thirty (30) days of receipt of this
Notice pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 19-2-110. Section 19-2-115 of the Utah Code
Annotated provides that violators of the Utah Air Conservation Act and/or any ORDER
issued thereunder may be subject to a civil penalty of up to $10,000.00 per day for
each violation.

Dated

3A
JTK

day of

At^^^

Ursula K. Trueman, Executive Secretary
Utah Air Quality Board

, 1999.

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
REGION VIII
938 18th STREET - SUITE 500
DENVER, COLORADO 80202-2466

8ENF-T

MAR

3 2000

Ms. Ursula Kramer.
Executive Secretary, .
Utah Air Quality Board
P.O. Box 144820
Salt Lake City, Utah. 84114^820

Re:

High Priority Violations at Wasatch Energy Systems

Dear Ms. Kramer:
This letter is to inform you of the United States Environmental Protection
Agency's concern with the operations of the Davis County incinerator and the proposed
settlement between the State of Utah and Wasatch Energy Systems (W.E.S.). As you
are aware, the U.S. Environmental'Protection Agency (EPA) has been closely following
the operations of this municipal waste incinerator. According to information provided
by your staff, emissions from the incinerator have historically exceeded emission limits
for a variety of pollutants. EPA is particularly concerned with the exceedances of the
dioxin/furan limit. W.E.S. is a current High Priority Violator based on violation of the
State permit limit for dioxins/furans as demonstrated by Reference Method testing on
September 17, 1998. Recent test results show one of the units emitting 1100 ng/dcsm
of dioxins/furan, more than three times the emission limit.
We understand that the Utah Division of Air Quality issued a Notice of Violation
and Compliance Order for the September 1998 violations and is planning to issue a
second NOV for the recent violations. We are also aware that W.E.S. has twice
previously been listed as a Significant Violator and yet was not assessed an
appropriate penalty by the State for these violations.
As you have discussed with Martin Hestrn^rk, there are a number of compelling
issues of concern at W.E.S., including a history of noncompliance, a lack of
cooperation in remedying the violations, a potential conflict of interest in that a member
of the Air Quality board holds a position with W.E.S., numerous citizen complaints
including a pending citizen's suit, and possible public health concerns regarding the
dioxin/furan emissions. EPA believes that W.E.S. is not currently in compliance with
emission limits based on Reference Method Testing. EPA would appreciate being

informed of the results from the December 1999 Reference Method testing once the
results are received by the State,
We understand that the State is preparing *o enter into a settlement with W.E.S.
that requires only the early installation of air pollution controls that will be required by
the proposed New Source Performance Standards, While this action will clearly benefit
the environment, EPA views it as insufficient to resolve W.E.S.' past and current
violations. To be acceptable to EPA, any settlement must also include substantial
penalties that factor in the economic benefit that WES has enjoyed during its fengthy
period of non-compliance, including both control equipment and operation and
maintenance practices. The BEN and Project models should be run to determine this
economic benefit,
The settlement also must require W.E.S. to immediately come into and remain
in compliance with the requirements of the 1996 Approval Order, with no variances
allowed, Monthly or quarterly testing should be required, with appropriate stipulated
penalties for exceadances. Compliance with the current permitted emission limits is
critical for ensuring protection of human health and the environment, While the State
has assured the public that the Davis County incinerator poses no risk, EPA does not
believe that there is sufficient data to make such a conclusion, Attached for your
consideration is EPA's regional toxicologist's evaluation of the "Characterization of Soil
and Milk Samples from the Wasatch Energy Systems Facility Environs" report dated
January 6, 1999. The report was required by the State's previous Consent Agreement
with W.E.S. The evaluation memorandum, written by our regional toxicologist,
Suzanne Wuerthele, Ph.D., points out some serious flaws in the report and outlines
where additional information is needed in order to draw conclusions about the safety of
human health and the environment surrounding the incinerator. We request a
discussion with your office once this evaluation is reviewed by your staff. It is our belief
that declarations that there is no risk cannot be made based on this report.
A settlement between the State and W.E.S. must also include a firm schedule for
installation and startup of the new controls with intermediate milestones and stipulated
penalties for any missed milestones. In the interim, it is imperative that W.E.S, take
steps to minimize dioxin/furan formation and emissions, including operating and
maintaining the plant in a manner consistent with good air pollution control practices.
Close monitoring of operational parameters and more frequent testing (monthly or
quarterly) are needed.
We realize that these issues need to be raised to State and EPA Senior
Managers and possibly the Executives per the "Air Program Compliance /Enforcement
Process from the FY2000 Performance Partnership Agreement". Our management is
prepared to respond to any questions. However, if the State signs a settlement with
W.E.S, that does not include each of the components discussed above, EPA will
consider taking its own enforcement action pursuant to the provisions of the Utah/EPA

Cooperative Enforcement Agreement. We hope to continue working cooperatively with
the State in our joint goal of bringing W.E.S. into permanent compliance. If you have
any questions or would like to discuss this matter, please feel free to contact me at
(303) 312-6180. I look forward to hearing from you.
Sincerely,

Ron Rutherford
Acting Director, Technical Enforcement
Office of Enforcement, Compliance, and
Environmental Justice
Enclosure

cc:

Marvin Maxell, UT-DAQ
Jeff Dean, UT-DAQ

